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Abstract 
This study focuses on the economic effects of introducing quotas to an open access fishery. 
When quotas are introduced, effort should decrease. This leads to higher prices and lower 
costs. Thus, overall profits should increase. An empirical analysis of profits in the Norwegian 
cod fisheries is conducted. Quotas were introduced in this fishery in 1990, and the dataset 
used covers 1985-2005. The empirical results suggest that there have been a considerable 
increase in profits for the fishers. Few variables on effort and opportunities explain profits. 
Binary variables for years with and without quotas, however, explain a lot of the change in 
profits. The effects of other changes to policy and market conditions are also controlled for. 
These indicate that the quotas increased profits in two rounds. First right after the 
introduction, and then again some years later, as fishers started to trade quotas. A simulation 
of the stock and landings is also conducted, which result in a simulation of profits. This 
suggest that profits have been larger post 1990 than they would have been had the open access 
been left as it was. 
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1 Introduction 
During the 1980s Norwegian fishers experienced several years of declining stocks of the 
North East Arctic Cod.1 Inspired by Iceland’s introduction of quota regimes to limit the 
harvest of cod in 1984 (Arnason 1993) and in New Zealand in 1986 (Mace and Sissenwine, 
1992), the Norwegian authorities in 1990 introduced a quota regime on the Norwegian cod 
fisheries. Although the intention may have been to save the stock of cod from annihilation, 
this regime shift had substantial economic consequences.  
An open access fishery is prone to become a Tragedy of the Commons. If a fisher leaves fish 
in the sea, this fish can grow and spawn. The fisher will incur a cost of one. His future gain is 
y/x, where y is the discounted future increase in the stock. x is number of fishers, since all 
will gain from his sacrifice. If the future is discounted at a fair rate and/or the number of 
fishers is large, his net present gain will be lower than his cost. Thus, he will never leave fish 
in the sea. This will drive effort up, profits down and the stock will stay on a small level. 
From a theoretical point of view, this closing of a previously open access fishery should 
therefore lead to a limited harvest, a healthier stock and higher profits. The question this paper 
will try to answer is 
Did the closing of the fishery for cod lead to higher profits for the fishers? And if this is the 
case, how much higher profits? 
Why is this interesting? First, it is interesting to see if the policy which intended to save the 
stock caused fisheries to be more economically self-sustainable. In the same period as the 
fisheries were closed, subsidies to the industry were cut. One intention of this investigation is 
to reveal whether the fishers made more money when receiving subsidies, or when fishing 
under a closed regime. 
Second, Norwegian politicians did not introduce a system where quotas were tradable. 
However, it is argued in the literature that the system has developed into one where quotas are 
traded, but with a lot of friction. The hypothesis that this happened will be tested.  
                                                 
1 NOR: Skrei 
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Third, is the system optimal today? Are there reasons why the laws governing the fishery 
should be amended, if one only looks at profits? Should the system be taxed heavier? 
Assessing the main question requires controlling for natural changes to the stock, changes in 
prices and for other government policies. A dataset obtained from the Directorate of Fisheries 
is used to give the answers. The dataset is based on the Directorates yearly profitability 
survey, and contains individual data on income, costs, landings etc. A panel data analysis of 
profits is performed. This will answer which factors explain profitability. Binary variables are 
included in the analysis in order to see if different policies matter for profitability. These 
cover the years the policy is in place. The estimated effect of these dummies tells us whether 
the policy had a ceteris paribus effect on profitability. 
A simulation of the profits is also done. Data on the stock of cod is obtained from the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). This is used to estimate how the 
stock would have developed without the introduction of a quota system. This simulation is 
used to adjust the landings of the individual fisher, and to simulate the price of cod in 
different years. Building on all this, counterfactual profits are simulated. If the simulation is 
lower, this is an indication that the profit margins would have been lower in the post 1990 era 
if the quotas had not been introduced. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a theoretical background for the 
quota regime, and the version seen in Norway. Section 3 describes how the stock is simulated 
as it would have been without quotas. Section 4 describes the data on profitability from the 
Directorate of Fisheries. Section 5 describes a simulation of counterfactual prices. Section 6 
describes the simulation of profits. Section 7 describes the regression analysis. Section 8 
discuss the results and concludes. Bibliography, Other Sources and Appendices are provided 
in the back. 
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2 Quotas 
The purpose of this section is both to explain quota regimes in its theoretical form and its 
implementation in Norway.  It will also be argued that some time-dependent binary variables 
should be included in the analysis, in order to control for changing policies and market 
conditions. 
In short, section 2 describes a textbook explanation of the differences between an open access 
and a closed regime. The change has some theoretical predictions for the fishery. First of all, 
profits under open access are zero by assumption. Since positive profits will draw more 
entrants into the fishery, this will draw overall prices down and costs up, to the point where 
all economic rents are dissipated. Changing to a closed regime will increase the profits, as 
new entrants are denied fishing.  
Second, the size of the stock should increase. This is based on the notion that in a fishery 
where everyone is free to enter, no one will have the stock in mind, only their own profits. For 
a given level of stock, the fishers will therefore land more fish if they are free to do so, than if 
they are faced with a maximization problem. 
The Norwegian implementation of quotas had a special character. The stated reason for the 
change in policy was not to increase the profits for the fishers; it was to save the stock. Other 
changes in policy also occurred in the period in question, and these need to be controlled for.   
A special implication discussed in this section is that if quotas are introduced without a lawful 
opportunity to trade in them, a market will occur anyway. Later this hypothesis will be tested. 
A discussion of whether the trade should be made lawful is found in section 8.4.  
2.1 Open and Closed Fisheries 
This section lays the theoretic framework for the rest of the thesis. A textbook explanation of 
the difference between an open and a closed fishery is described. Section 2.1 is based in its 
entirety on Perman et.al. (2011, chapter 17). The model described is of the simplest static 
form, but it is to the point. For a description of a dynamic world, the source should be 
consulted. 
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2.1.1 Growth and Harvest 
A fishery is a stock of fish that is harvested for economic purposes. The stock of fish is 
normally denoted S and measured in tons. Its Growth Function is a function of the stock itself. 
It is denoted G = G(S), and is assumed to have some kind of bell shape. For the purpose of 
this work, logistic growth is assumed. 
ܩሺܵሻ ൌ ݃ ቀ1 െ ௌௌ೘ೌೣቁ ܵ        (2.1) 
In equation (2.1), g is a parameter saying something about intrinsic growth. This is the growth 
in the stock if the stock itself is very small. Smax is the maximum carrying capacity of the 
environment the stock lives in, the maximum tons of fish the sea could possibly support. The 
growth G(S) thus increases to a certain level of the stock, and starts falling. As the stock 
grows beyond this point and approach Smax, growth approaches zero. Thus growth is concave 
in its whole domain. 
The stock is harvested by fishers. This Harvest is denoted as H. and can be written as  
ܪ ൌ ݁ܧܵ    (2.2) 
In equation (2.2), E stands for effort and S for stock. Harvest grows in both; if more effort is 
laid down or if the stock is higher, more fish is caught ceteris paribus. e is a catch ability 
coefficient. It represents efficiency, or technology. Higher e gives higher landings for given 
levels of effort and stock. 
The growth minus the harvest is the net growth in the stock: 
డௌ
డ௧ ൌ ܩ െ ܪ      (2.3) 
Equation (2.3) shows the differentiated value of the stock over time. This equals Growth – 
Harvest. 
2.1.2 Benefits and Costs of fishing 
The fishers gain revenue for their landings. This can be represented by the equation 
ܤ ൌ ܲܪ      (2.4) 
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In equation (2.4), P is price and H is Harvest, as before. Fishers also have costs of fishing. In 
this setup, these are represented by the costs of effort, with the unit-cost w: 
ܥ ൌ ݓܧ     (2.5) 
The net benefit of fishing is called NB and is defined as: 
ܰܤ ൌ ܤ െ ܥ ൌ ܲܪ െ ݓܧ    (2.6) 
2.1.3 Equilibrium 
The model is closed by stating a biological and an economic equilibrium. The first is based on 
the idea that the stock should stay on a fixed level. This means that the net growth in equation 
(2.3) should equal zero, and thus Growth and harvest should equal: 
ܩ ൌ ܪ      (2.7) 
An open access fishery is recognized by the property that anyone can join it. If there are 
profits to be made, in the sense of higher earnings than in comparable jobs ashore, fishers will 
join. They will do so to the point where the profits are eroded away. This happens through 
two effects. Because more fish is offered on the market, prices will fall. And because more 
fishers are present in the fishery, the necessary effort of catching the last fish will increase to a 
level where the costs of catching it equal the revenues. This is based on the notion that some 
fish are easy to catch, and some are harder. The easy ones cost less in terms of effort, and are 
caught first.  
For the purpose of this theoretical framework, all fishers are assumed to be equally efficient. 
Thus the economic equilibrium is recognizable by the notion that profits should be zero. This 
means that equation (2.6) should equal zero and 
ܲܪ ൌ ݓܧ     (2.8) 
2.1.4 Open Access Equilibrium 
By replacing G and H in equation (2.7) with their respective definitions in equations (2.1) and 
(2.2), and rearranging, equation (2.9) is obtained: 
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ܵ ൌ ܵ௠௔௫ ቀ1 െ ௘௚ ܧቁ    (2.9) 
Equation (2.9) gives the stock as a function of its maximum limit, Effort by the fishers and the 
parameters for efficiency in fishing and intrinsic growth in the stock. 
Substitute (2.9) into the Harvest Function in (2.2) and obtain the Harvest as a function of the 
same parameters: 
ܪ ൌ ݁ܧܵ௠௔௫ ቀ1 െ ௘௚ ܧቁ    (2.10) 
Equations (2.8) and (2.10) together represent two equations in two unknowns, Harvest and 
Effort. By solving this system, it is possible to find their equilibrium values. By inserting 
these values into (2.9), the equilibrium value of the stock is obtained (OA is an abbreviation 
for open access): 
ܧை஺ ൌ ௚௘ ቀ1 െ
௪
௉௘ௌ೘ೌೣቁ    (2.11) 
ܵை஺ ൌ ௚௪௉௘                 (2.12) 
ܪை஺ ൌ ௚௪௉௘ ቀ1 െ
௪
௉௘ௌ೘ೌೣቁ    (2.13) 
2.1.5 The Closed Fishery 
In a perfect world, one person owns the whole fishery, and has to take all the results of his 
actions into account. This means that he maximizes todays and all future profits with respect 
to certain conditions, and adjusts his landings thereafter. An alternative to the view that one 
person own the whole fishery is that many fishers own it together, and adjust their landings in 
order to maximize the aggregate profits of the fishery. 2 This is called a closed or private 
property fishery. 
The change from the open access case is that the fisher(s) will maximize profits: 
ܯܽݔ	ܰܤ ൌ ܲܪ െ ݓܧ    (2.14) 
                                                 
2 See Demsetz (1967) for a discussion of property rights. 
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By substituting the Harvest Function into this, and maximizing w.r.t Effort, the first order 
condition is obtained. By substituting the stock from equation (2.9) into the FOC and 
differentiating, equation (2.15) is obtained: 
ܲ݁ܵ௠௔௫ െ 2ܲܧܵ௠௔௫ ቀ௘
మ
௚ ቁ ൌ ݓ     (2.15) 
Equation (2.15) show that under the condition of maximized profits the marginal benefit and 
costs of Effort is equal. Thus this is the limiting constraint on the fishers; they fish till their 
effort no longer pays of. This can be solved for Effort to give 
ܧ∗ ൌ ଵଶ
௚
௘ ቀ1 െ
௪
௉௘ௌ೘ೌೣቁ    (2.16) 
This can be substituted into (2.9) to give  
ܵ∗ ൌ ଵଶ
௉௘ௌ೘ೌೣ	ା	௪
௉௘                 (2.17) 
And using H = eES: 
ܪ∗ ൌ ଵସ ݃ ቀܵ௠௔௫ െ
௪మ
௉మ௘మௌ೘ೌೣቁ    (2.18) 
2.1.6 Open Access versus Closed fishery 
Comparing the equilibrium results in (2.11) - (2.13) and (2.16) - (2.18), it is evident that the 
open access fishery yields lower levels of the stock than the private property fishery. By 
assumption, profits under open access is zero, and larger than zero in a closed fishery. 
In this simplified model, the equilibrium Effort is only half as large in a closed fishery as it is 
in an open access fishery. But even in a more complicated model the Effort will always be 
lower in the closed case. By inserting the two equilibrium Efforts into the Harvest Function  
H = eES, and plotting against the growth, it is evident from Figure 1 that the growth in 
Harvest as the stock grows is larger under open access than in a closed fishery: 
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Figure 1: Harvest versus effort in open and closed fisheries 
From Figure 1 it is seen that the equilibrium solution for the stock is larger in a closed than in 
an open fishery. It is also seen that the higher Effort yields a steeper Harvest Function for the 
open access than for the closed fishery. And in this figure, equilibrium harvest is higher under 
open access than in the closed case. But this is not necessarily so. If the two Harvest functions 
are steeper, the two equilibrium Harvests come closer, and at a point the closed case Harvest 
will climb above the open access case. This is due to the quadratic form of the Growth 
function G(S). 
2.2 Closing the Fishery 
2.2.1 Why? 
From the theory described in section 2.1, it is clear that an open access fishery is a market 
with externalities. However, for most of mans history, fisheries have been open. There are 
several reasons why this is the case.3 First, in order to really threaten the existence of a stock, 
the level of technology has to come to a certain level. Even if more people were engaged in 
fishing in earlier times, they could not fish the ocean empty. 
                                                 
3 Homans and Wilen (1997) discuss the differences between theoretical open access and real-world applications. 
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Second, an effective state is needed to place regulations. And this state has to take the costs of 
making unpopular decisions. In the northern parts of Norway the sentiment seems to have 
been that unconstrained fishing is a human right. 
If an effective state is in place, it has at least three alternatives in its approach to a general 
fisheries policy. If the people revolt at the thought of regulations, and the technological level 
is on a level where the stock is unthreatened, the state probably will chose to leave the fishery 
open.  
The state could also choose the objective to maximize efficiency, or profits. Some kind of 
closing is an option. This will increase the profits to the fishers, and taxes to the state. If the 
state further charges a resource tax, as the Norwegian state does on oil production, it can 
increase its income further. As a bonus, the equilibrium level of the stock will go to a larger 
level. In a stochastic world, were the stock is affected by sickness, predation from other 
species etc., this is an insurance against annihilation. 
On the other hand, the state can have as its objective to avoid this annihilation. This is 
applicable if the stock has come down to a very low level. This is the reason why the 
Norwegian fisheries for cod were closed in 1990. Then a nice by-effect of the closing will be 
the increased tax-revenue from the fisheries. 
2.2.2 How? 
In order to create profits in the fishery, some kind of management is needed. Theoretically, a 
tax that internalizes the externality would be optimal, correcting the market failure. The tax 
would have to bring the private cost of catching the marginal unit of fish up to the social cost. 
However, this is not a feasible solution; it is not possible to transfer the theoretical beauty to 
the real world (Perman et.al., 2011, p 596-598). 
A feasible solution is to set a Total Allowable Catch (TAC). (Perman et.al., 2011, p 599).4 It 
has to be based on biological estimates of the size of the stock. Its goal can be to keep the 
stock safe from annihilation, to maximize Harvest in the long run, or to maximize economic 
profits. In most real fisheries where it is used it is a scientific advice on what is the optimal 
                                                 
4 See Asche et.al., (2009), for a good discussion of TAC, ITQ, and its effects. 
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catch of a stock in order to obtain sustainable harvest in the longer term. The TAC is then 
adjusted every year. 
The important aspect is that total Harvest is limited, and thus profits for the fishers has to be 
maximized with a new constraint: 
ܪഥ ൌ ݁ܧܵ     (2.19) 
If the TAC is set so high that it is not filled, it is not a binding constraint on the fishery. If it is 
binding, the zero-profit assumption is no longer binding. However, in this model, more 
entrants will join the fishery if there are profits. This will drive total costs up to the point 
where fishers again make zero profits. 
By dividing the TACs into quotas, an artificial property right is established for the fishers. 
Although they do not calculate their long term profit when deciding how much effort to use, 
they do limit it in a way that creates less aggregate harvest. In turn, this creates a healthier 
stock. The lower landings lead to short term profits, through two effects. First, since each boat 
land smaller volumes, the cost of catching the fish is lower. Second, because the aggregate 
landings are lower, with constant demand the price of fish increases. Thus, on the margin, 
there is a profit of catching fish (Perman et.al., 2011, p 598-600). This is called the Individual 
effect, or Individuality. Individuality gives the fisher control over his own effort. He can plan 
his own season and effort, what matters is that he delivers his quota. 
The quotas are called Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ). The transferability of quotas is 
also important, because there are efficient and inefficient fishers. Let us say the market price 
of the quota is 20, and that the net present value of continuing in the fishery with that quota is 
10 for the inefficient and 30 for the efficient. The inefficient fishers will gain 10 from selling 
their quota, and the efficient will gain 10 from buying it. Thus, after an auction, or some 
period of trading, the effort should be concentrated on the most efficient fishers, and the TAC 
will be harvested with the least possible effort (Perman et.al., 2011, p 599-600). This will 
increase profits. It is also reasonable that the profits of the efficient fishers will further 
increase as they can invest in larger boats and gear, enjoying economics of scale and 
becoming even more efficient.5  
                                                 
5 For a discussion of the distributional effects of ITQ in Iceland, see Eythórsson (2000). 
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2.3 The Norwegian Case 
This thesis shall focus on the North East Arctic (NEA) cod and the coastal fleet of vessels 
below 28 meters, fishing with traditional gear.6 One reason is that the size of the analysis 
should be limited. Another reason is that this fleet is quite stationary, they fish on their local 
fishing grounds or travel along the coast to seek opportunities, like in Lofoten. The seagoing 
fleet is more versatile, going up to Svalbard, to Iceland or Greenland to seek opportunities. 
This makes an analysis of the coastal fleet better suited to say something about the 
profitability in Norwegian fisheries. A third reason is that the dataset used only cover the 
years 1985-2005. As explained in this section, the coastal fleet experienced a regime shift in 
1990. Obviously there were indirect effects on the landings off the seagoing fleet, but these 
can not be measured in the data. 
2.3.1 Background for Regime Shift 
Norway has vast fishery resources within its economic zones. It shares these resources largely 
with Russia and Iceland, as well as the EU (Bjørndal and Årland, 2002, p 307-308). These 
resources can therefore hardly be said to be affected only by Norwegian management.  
Norway has a long history7 of dividing the fleet into sea going vessels, often trawlers, and 
coastal vessels using traditional gear. It has been the policy to keep the larger, more efficient 
vessels out of the largest fisheries on the Norwegian coast. Trawlers have been outlawed from 
within 4 miles from the coast since 1908 (Hersoug, 2005, p 34). Purse seiners have not been 
allowed in the Lofoten fishery since 1958 (Hannesson et.al, 2010, p 762).  
Within the coastal fishery, the seasonal fishery for NEA Cod in Lofoten is the most 
economically important, and has been so for maybe the last 1000 years (Hannesson et.al, 
2011, p 748). Regulation has been gradually imposed over the last century, but prior to 1980, 
                                                 
6 Traditional or conventional gear includes long lines, gill nets and hand lines, as well as other, less used gear. 
See St. meld. 21 (2006-2007) for a useful list of explanations (In Norwegian).   
7 Improving technology has caused tensions between small boat fishers and modern vessels for many years. In 
March 1890 a few large steam driven seiners closed in a large share of the stock in the Trollfjord in Lofoten. 
This caused a fight between the crews of the seiners and smaller crafts, later known as the “Trollfjord Battle”. 
This incident directly affected the Lofoten Act of 1897 which prohibited seine in Lofoten. When the larger, more 
capital intense vessels turned to trawling, the same sentiment caused their prohibition from coastal fishery in 
1908. (Hersoug et.al., 2000a , p 357)  
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no serious limitation on fisher’s effort was made. In 1982 a time limitation was introduced in 
the Lofoten cod fishery; i.e., the authorities would set a TAC and stop the fishery when it was 
caught. The fishers would have to make their effort prior to the closing date, causing more 
intensive competition among the fishers, and probably lower quality. Maximum quotas8 were 
introduced in 1983, but were set so high that few boats were affected by it (Hersoug, 2005, p 
111). This regime might thus be described as a quasi-open access; even if there were 
regulations, the fishers had little incentive to limit their catch. In retrospect, it seems like a 
tragedy of the commons would “have to” arrive in the cod fisheries. 
The stock of cod fell dramatically during the 1980s, and in the 1989 season the conventional 
TAC9 was very small.10 Because the weather was favourable, and the fish swam up to the 
shallow waters this year, the TAC was taken and the fish was closed already on April 18th, 
perhaps 6 weeks earlier than usual (Hersoug, 2005, p 113). 
2.3.2 Implementation of Quotas 
With this background, quotas were introduced as a crises measure in the fall of 1989. They 
were not supposed to be permanent; the Ministry of Fisheries argued that they were needed to 
help the stock grow, and that they would be removed after some time (Hersoug, 2005, p 113). 
However, this limitation on the fishery still exists.  
The quotas introduced in 1990 were not transferable;11 they were attached to the boat, and 
therefore called Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQ). The quotas were granted on the basis of 
                                                 
8 Maximum quotas are quotas on individual fishers. Group quotas are quotas on a group of fishers. The 
Maximum quotas does not always sum up to the Group quota. If the sum of Maximum quotas is larger than the 
Group quota it is called Overregulation. This is often done to ensure that the Group quota is caught, because 
some fishers do not catch their Maximum quota. (Bjørndal and Årland, 2002, p 310) 
9 By conventional TAC here I mean the proportion of the Total Allowable Catch given to conventional gear, the 
coastal fleet. The total TAC is set by the ICES in order to get sustainable yields over time. Yearly negotiations 
between Norway and Russia divide this quota between the two countries. The rule that divide the Norwegian 
part of the TAC into a share to the trawlers and share to conventional gear is called the Trawl-ladder. For small 
TACs, the proportion is high, 80% if it is below 100000 tons, but it is falling in TAC. The Trawl-ladder has 
changed several times, for a thorough discussion, consult Hersoug (2005, p 141) 
10 See page 34, section 3.5.1 for a graph on the development in the stock. 
11 For a discussion of the political climate leading to the IVQ-regime instead of a full-scale ITQ, see Hersoug 
(2005, chapter 6). The whole book is about the fight over policy in Norway. To sum up short, policy rarely is 
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catches12 13 in the 1987-1989 season (Hersoug, 2005, p 113-114). Those who had fished 
actively in these years were allocated in Group 1. Others, considered to have fishing as a part-
time business, were allocated in Group 2. Higher quotas were granted to Group 1. An 
economically more sound approach would be to auction the quotas to the highest bidder 
(Nøstbakken, 2009, p 3). This way the most efficient fishers, with most to gain from fishing, 
would outbid the less efficient and thus fish the quota at the lowest cost. This auctioning 
could have been done even if the quotas were to be IVQs. 
Hersoug (2005, p 113) argues that aspect of efficiency was not that important when quotas 
were introduced. For the politicians it was more important to secure a temporary regime that 
was fair, which was ensured by rewarding the fishers that had been effective earlier. 
Hersoug (2005, p 134-135) argues that there is a “closing-logic” operating in Norwegian 
fisheries. Quotas are a result of TACs, since there is no point in estimating the TAC if it is not 
to be used for something good. The quotas take the form of IVQ, because there is no political 
will to introduce a full-scale ITQ. Furthermore, Hersoug et.al (2000b) and Aarset and Standal 
(2008) argue that a path dependent process lead to de facto ITQs. As soon as IVQs are 
established, fishers will start trading in the proxy asset, the boats. In other words, they will 
calculate the value of the quota belonging14 to the boat into its value, and start trading. 
Changing the regime back is not an option, as no politician wants to be responsible for taking 
away fishermen’s property – the quotas – and redistributing them to fishers who have not paid 
for them.  
                                                                                                                                                        
backed by economic arguments. A main idea of Hersoug is that as soon as you create (quasi) property rights to 
the fish, you create a market for quotas, intended or not. 
12 The way I read Eikeland (1991) he state that the quotas were granted on the basis of length of the boat. This is 
a factual contradiction to Hersoug (2005, p 114). I have to believe Hersoug, as the work by Eikeland is a 
Masters-thesis (Hovedfagsoppgave), and Hersoug is a much cited and renowned author. One should anyway not 
trust a Masters-thesis. 
13 Granting quotas on this basis of course has a dynamic element. Say that the authorities announce that at a date 
in future, they will give generous quotas to those who fish a lot now. Obviously, all fishers will adjust their effort 
to get more quotas in the future, if not to use, then to sell. See Hersoug (2005, p 129) for a discussion. Because 
the quotas were introduced with no time to adjust effort, this dynamic element is not important in this case. 
14 No quotas actually belong to boats. They are given licences to fish, and these licenses are renewed each year. 
Non-renewal happens extremely seldom. See Hersoug et.al (2000b, p 327) for a discussion. 
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2.3.3 Development of policies in the 1990s 
In the course of the 1990s, the regime gradually changed. In 1989, 7500 boats were 
considered to be part of the active coastal fleet. After regulation the number of Group 1 boats 
was 3500. As the fishery picked up in the 1990s, the difference between owning a boat with 
and without a quota was immense. Soon the value of quotas was calculated into the price of 
the vessel when they were traded, and the system thus approached an ITQ system (Hersoug, 
2005, p 160). Hersoug et.al. (2000b, p 327) argue that this had started to happen when their 
paper was written. 
In 1991, it was decided that the trade of vessels must be done within counties (Hersoug, 2005, 
p 116). This implies that both the buyer and the seller must now have been a registered 
fisherman in the same county for the last 12 months before the sale.15 (St. meld. 20, 2002-
2003:27). This was consistent with the role fisheries have in Norwegian rural policy; the boats 
should be kept within the county. What was known to happen was that the buyer transferred 
the quota to his first boat, and sold the boat back to a fisher in Group 2, often to the original 
owner (Hersoug, 2005, p 116 &160). Theoretically, this limitation should lead to regional 
differences in boat prices, and implicitly in quota values. 
In the early 1990s quotas were overregulated each year; the sum of maximum quotas was 
higher than the group-quota. The purpose of this was to make sure that the whole group-quota 
would be taken, as some fishers would not finish their quota. At a given, predetermined 
redistribution date, the authorities would redistribute quota from those who had fished a small 
part of their quota, to those who had fished a lot. The aggregate catch was still limited to the 
group-quota, in order to stop overfishing (Hersoug, 2005, p 118-119).   
When the quotas was originally distributed in 1990, only the smallest vessels got 100% of 
their historical catch as quota, while the larger ones got a percentage decreasing in vessel-size; 
boats of 27 metres only got 50%. In the mid 1990s the TAC increased, and the small boats 
could seldom catch 100% of their quota. The large coastal fleet could fish their (small) quota 
prior to the redistribution date, and then get a new quota after redistribution, as the unused 
quota from the smaller vessels were redistributed. This caused large investments in the large 
coastal vessels (Hersoug, 2005, p 114-119). 
                                                 
15 For North-Troms and Finnmark the sellers does not have to be registered there; thus buyers in these counties 
can buy from the whole country. (St. meld. 20,2002-2003:27) 
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Towards the end of the decade, the overregulation came down from 100% to about 20%.16 
This gave much smaller growth in the large coastal-fleet, as the larger vessels no longer got 
hold of new quotas after the redistribution date. The growth effectively ended in 2002 with 
the introduction of the Finnmarks-model, in which the coastal boats were divided into four 
length-groups; <10, 10-15, 15-21 and 21-28 metres.17 Redistribution of quota now happened 
only within each size-group, and large coastal vessels could no longer rely on getting extra 
quotas from small vessels (Hersoug, 2005, p 120-121 & 159). 
2.3.4 Structural Policy 
A twin program of fleet reduction was in operation in the last part of the period in question. 
From July 2003 the Condemnation Scheme gave coastal fishers the option to give up their 
activity and get a monetary compensation from the state. The quota was redistributed on the 
rest of the size-group the boat was a part of. Thus, boats not quitting received quotas from 
those who did quit (St. meld nr. 21, 2006–2007, p 15.) 
From January 2004, the Structural Quota System (SQS) gave the fishers the opportunity to 
give up the activity on one boat and carry 80% of the quota over to another boat. The last 20% 
was redistributed on the rest of the fleet, which implies that fishers not taking part in the 
transaction were also provided with larger quotas under this scheme. This arrangement was 
available only to vessels between 15-28 meters. One vessel could acquire a maximum of three 
quotas, and the transfers were limited to the length-group the boat was in. For quotas of cod, 
haddock and saithe, the transfers were also limited to counties (Hersoug, 2005, p 162-163). 
2.3.5 Quota Exchange System 
From July 2003 a Quota Exchange System (QES) was introduced, in order to meet a demand 
for a more flexible trade of quotas. Under the scheme, whole or parts of quotas could be 
exchanged for quotas in other fisheries, or leased out. This laid the ground for more 
specialised fisheries, making fishers able to cut cost by equipping their boat only with gear to 
                                                 
16 x% over-regulation mean that the sum of all maximum-quotas is x% larger than the group-quota. 
17 Thus, since 1995 there have been six groups in the coastal fleet: the four length-groups in Group 1, Group 2 
and boats larger than 28 metres. 
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catch i.e. demersal fish. The quota could be exchanged only three out of every five years, and 
the deal had to be signed before the start of the fishery.  
Although creating flexibility, this system probably limited the effect of the SQS. Boats that 
otherwise would sell their quota, now could lease out part of it and gradually reduce their 
activity (Hersoug, 2005, p 161). Hersoug (2005, p 169) argue that the SQS and the QES 
actually have worked against each other, by showing that fishers prefer to lease quotas as long 
as possible. Together, SQS and QES constituted a softening of the IVQ regime. Trade and 
leasing of quotas made the system look more and more like ITQ. 
2.3.6 Other changes to the fisheries in the 1990s 
In 1964 the state and the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association (NFA) entered into what was 
called the Main Agreement on Fisheries. The agreement regulated the relationship between 
the state and the fishers. The state used NFA as representatives of the fishers, and the yearly 
negotiations on subsidies took place in this forum (Christensen and Hallenstvedt, 2005, p 155-
160). The subsidies to harvesting were generous, but fell dramatically after 1990. From 1991 
to 1993 they decreased from more than 1 billion to less than 400 million NOK in aggregate. 
In 2002 they totaled at about 175 million (Flaaten and Hermansen, 2004, p 15). In 2005, the 
Main Agreement was terminated by the Norwegian Parliament. The subsidies were no longer 
seen as necessary to keep the fisheries active (Press release Ministry of Fisheries 47/2004). 
Although there is no reason to dismiss the effects of the subsidies on the fleet, they will not be 
treated thoroughly here. First of all, as Flaaten and Hermansen (2004) argue, they are hard to 
pin down and the data are not easily accessible. Second, subsidies are not reported as a 
separate post in the data, but are a part of revenues. Thus, profits become abnormally high. As 
an isolated effect, the decrease in subsidies should lead to a fall in profits in the 1990s. 
Subsidies and quotas thus have opposing effects on individual profits. Since the subsidies 
disappeared in the same period as quotas were introduced, increasing or even stable profits 
would be a strong indicator that quotas lead to better margins for the fishers. Thus, in order to 
answer the problem of this thesis the need to explain subsidies’ effect on the fleet is not 
strong. 
From 1990 80% of the conventional TAC was given to Group 1, and then distributed to the 
fishers according to size of their quota. 20% went to Group 2. From 1995 the coastal fleet 
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larger than 28 meters has been treated as one group (Hersoug, 2005, p 114 & 117). These 
vessels have received 12.8% of the TAC, leaving 77.7% to Group 1, and 9.5% to Group 2 (St. 
meld. 20, 2002-2003, p 35).  
Thus, the Group 2 part-time fishermen conceded to large reduction in their quotas, both to 
larger vessels and to equally large vessels with full time fishers. In order to remain in the 
favourable Group 1, from 1994 fishers had to deliver at least 40% of their quota each year. 
This was done to be able to redistribute quota to new entrants, securing some recruitment of 
new fishermen (Hersoug, 2005, p 117). 
It is always hard to track what fishers are really doing, even if they are registered in a central 
archive. But it seems like the coastal fishery became capital-stuffed in the 1990s. This means 
that the boats carry sub-optimally high levels of capital. In this business, more gear means 
smaller crew, as the machinery takes the place of the workforce. Thus, the request for hired 
fishermen goes down. Because of the limitation on catch, but not on timing of the catch, so 
called “Skipper Fishery” has emerged. This means that two or more skippers can crew each 
others boats in turn, and thus fill their quota with no or low cost to wages (Hersoug, 2005, p 
132-133). This might partially explain why the proportion of young fishers has gone down 
radically since 1990. Even if new fishers can buy a boat without quota, fish as much as they 
are allowed under the Group 2 quota, and thus get a Group 1 quota, they cannot get 
experience from crewing on Group 1 boats. 
Fishing cod cause by-catches of saithe and haddock, which complicate the regulation of these 
fisheries. From 2002 vessels in Group 1 of less than 15m participated in a project were they 
got a common quota for these three species. Catch of the other two was calculated into 
equivalents to cod, and cod limited to 70% of the overall quota.  The conversion rates were 
quite favourable, so that the less profitable saithe and haddock were harvested as well. This 
system makes it possible for the authorities to manage the three species by changing the 
conversion rates. Vessels of the size 15-28 meter still get individual IVQs for all three species 
(Hersoug, 2005, p 124-126).  
All in all, section 2.3 can be summed up with saying that the political regime moved from 
(almost) open-access to (almost) closed fishery in the 1980s. Further, it is possible to argue as 
Hersoug et.al (2000b, p 326-328) that the IVQ system was softened in the 1990s, when the 
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market for vessels started to take the value of quotas into account. If this seems too vague, 
one could argue that a softening of the IVQ regime occurred with the SQS and QES. 
It is also clear that Norwegian quota policy is quite complicated compared to Iceland’s or 
New Zealand’s ITQ system. This is because the Norwegian model seeks to cover a number of 
goals. When you transfer quota between your boats, 20% of it goes to perfect strangers who 
has done nothing to earn it. This is to reach out a hand to those in opposition of the SQS. 
Quotas can only be traded within counties, in order to keep with traditional Norwegian rural-
area policy. And the Finnmarks-model was established to keep the diversified fleet, small and 
large, side by side (Hersoug 2005:166). The Ministry of Fisheries has many measures at hand, 
and seems to seek many goals with these. 
2.4 Implications for the analysis 
From the theory in section 2.1 some predictions come out about what should have happened 
to Norwegian fisheries after 1990. The stock should grow, and profits should increase. 
From section 2.3 it is clear that several binary variables need to be tested in the analysis. The 
obvious one is one that take on the value zero in 1985-1989, and one in the period 1990-2005. 
This dummy will be a proxy for the introduction of quotas. When analyzing the causes of 
variation in profits, this will be included as an explanatory variable. The dummy is called D1. 
Hersoug et.al (2000b, p 326-328) argue that the regime at this point had turned into a quasi-
ITQ system, because value of vessels in trade largely reflected the value of rights to fishing. 
This paper is written in 1999. It is therefore not unreasonable to state the hypothesis that the 
regime changed from IVQ to ITQ in the years before. This process would by nature be 
gradual, but in order to investigate whether or not it took place, it is necessary to set a specific 
date. The year chosen is 1998. This is very speculative, and has to be this author’s 
responsibility. But by generating two separate dummies, one with value one in 1990-1997 and 
one with value one in 1998-2005, it is possible to test the explanatory power of this 
hypothesis. The first dummy would then test the effect on profits from Individuality, and the 
other would test the effect of Tradability. The dummies are called D2 and D3 respectively. 
Another reason for choosing 1998 is that this year the Directorate of Fisheries started a new 
way of sampling their data (see section 4 for details). The dataset became stronger, which 
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reduced measurement errors. Thus, by exploiting the length of the dataset before 1998, and 
the lower measurement error in the remaining years, an increase in profits should indicate that 
the proposed transition from IVQ to ITQ-regime increased profits. 
As mentioned, it is quite speculative to assume the regime changed sometime in the 1990s. 
However, there is good reason to test whether or not the SQS and QES changed the IVQ 
system (see section 2.3.4 and 2.3.5). These were both introduced at the very end of the period 
the dataset cover, from the 2004 season. Also, SQS only covered boats in the sizes between 
15 and 28 meters. Therefore it is natural to include two dummies. D4 takes on the value one 
in 2004-2005 if the boat is 15-28m. This is meant as a proxy for SQS. D5 takes on the value 
one in 2004-2005, irrespective of the length of the boat. This is meant as a proxy for QES. 
As discussed in section 2.3.3, there was a growth in number of robust coastal vessels in the 
1990s. This was caused by overregulation. When the Finnmarks-model was introduced in 
2002, the robust vessels no longer got quotas from smaller vessels that failed to fill their 
quota. A question of interest is whether or not these vessels maintained their profitability after 
this period. A binary variable will therefore be included to investigate this. It will take on the 
value zero in 1985-1989 and 2002-2005, and one in 1990-2002. This dummy is called D6. 
It is not possible to know beforehand how large the vessels had to be in order to experience an 
increase in profits and landings. This part of the analysis will therefore be done several times, 
first with boats ranging 25-28m, then 22-28m, then 19-28m and at last with boats 15-28m. 
Since the largest boats got largest quotas out of overregulation, the analysis is most likely to 
show that boats in the range 25-28m gained the most in terms of profit and landings. Notice 
that the length classes applied here does not coincide with those in the Finnmarks-model. 
Groups of approximately equal intervals are included to get a sort of linearity in the increase.  
One should see these dummies for what they are; hypothesis to be tested. A critique of the 
pair D2 and D3 is that to pin down a year the change happened is impossible. Because the 
dataset available ends in 2005, an effect of D4 and D5 on profits can not be very significant. 
Testing the effect of D6 for the largest boats should capture the effect of large boats being 
able to receive “bonus quotas”. But as this analysis is done with more and more boats, there is 
a risk that the dummy captures the Individuality effect. 
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3 Counterfactual stock of Cod 
3.1 Why? 
When analyzing profits, and whether or not the new quota regime caused them to grow, one 
needs to make some comparisons between the observed and the counterfactual cases. It is 
therefore necessary to simulate how the stock of cod could have developed without a quota 
regime after 1990. The purpose of this exercise is to find a ratio between counterfactual and 
observed landings. Using this ratio, it is possible to adjust individual landings accordingly.  
Furthermore, it is possible to regress prices on actual aggregate landings. The prices in this 
function are adjusted for inflation in the period. By changing the input from actual aggregate 
landings to simulated, this result in counterfactual prices. This is done in section 5. 
This prediction is for NEA Cod, which is one of several species of demersal fish targeted by 
Norwegian fishers. Thus, only part of the fish regulated by the quotas is simulated 
counterfactually. This is a justifiable simplification, as this species mean most to fishers in 
terms of economy – see Figure 2 and Figure 3. Also it was the collapse of this species that 
caused the change of policy. Further, it would be far too complicated to predict the 
development of other species in light of the change of policy for NEA Cod. Sure, the change 
of regime for NEA Cod affected other species, in terms of access to food and predation. But it 
is not obvious in what direction and in what magnitude. 
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Figure 2: Value of landings for different species 
 
Figure 3: Relative value of landed Cod. Percentage. 
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Without doubt, this approach has some uncertainty attached to it. Nevertheless, it is an 
exciting and necessary way to analyze how things could have been. 
The simulation is done for the stock of cod in the years 1990-2005, as the data on the 
economics of the fleet is restricted to 1985-2005 and the shift in regime was effective from 
1990. Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 are not crucial for understanding the rest of the thesis, but it is 
advised to take a look at the results in section 3.5 and the adjustment of individual fishers’ 
landings in section 3.6. 
3.2 Definitions 
Following Beverton and Holt (1957, ch. 3) and Clark (1976, p 269-276), the following 
definitions are used in simulating the stock of cod. When describing a stock of fish, the 
aggregate number that tells us how large it is is Total biomass – TBM. It is defined as  
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܤ݅݋݉ܽݏݏ ൌ ܶܤܯ௧ ൌ 	∑ ௔ܰ,௧ ∗ ܣ ௔ܹ,௧ଵଷା௔ୀଷ     (3.1) 
௔ܰ,௧	is the number of fish of a certain age a at time t. ܣ ௔ܹ,௧	is the average weight of fish of a 
certain age a at time t. ܶܤܯ௧	is measured in tons. The fish are counted from the age of three, 
and that cohort is called 	ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧ each year: 
ଷܰ,௧ ൌ ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧ 
	ܣ ௔ܹ,௧	is Average Weight of the fish of that age, or cohort.  
Only a percentage of each cohort are mature, for the younger fish almost none, for the older 
almost all. In order to describe how large the stock is that produces new fish 
ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	ܯܽݐݑݎ݁௔,௧	is included in the above equation, in order to get 
ܵ݌ܽݓ݊݅݊݃	ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	ܤ݅݋݉ܽݏݏ௧	 ൌ ܵܵܤ௧ ൌ ∑ ௔ܰ,௧ ∗ ܣ ௔ܹ,௧ଵଷା௔ୀଷ ∗ ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	ܯܽݐݑݎ݁௔,௧   (3.2) 
ܵ݌ܽݓ݊݅݊݃	ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	ܤ݅݋݉ܽݏݏ௧	is measured in tons.18	 
ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧	 is the total catch of fish, measured in tons.  
                                                 
18 NOR: Kjønnsmoden 
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ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧			cause		ܨ݅ݏ݄݅݊݃	ܯ݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௔,௧ ൌ ܨܯ௔.௧; i.e. the deaths of a certain cohort related 
to catches. ܰܽݐݑݎ݈ܽ	ܯ݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௧ ൌ 	ܰܯ௧	is a sum of two causes of death. The first is 
sickness, predation etc., which is commonly assumed to be 0.2. The other is cannibalism. 
Cannibalism within the stock is larger if other species, other sources of food, are small in a 
given year. Cannibalism is measured each year, and cause the variability in ܰܯ௧.19 
3.3 Data 
Data on the NEA Cod are obtained from the International Council for the Exploration of the 
Seas (ICES).  
For each year 1946-2009, the dataset give calculations on Total Biomass, Spawning Stock 
Biomass, Recruits and Landings. Furthermore, it gives	ܰܯ௧	, Average Weight of each cohort, 
and Percentage Mature in each cohort. 
A biologist might say that the data are calculated from small samples, and that it is impossible 
to obtain the level of accuracy the ICES claim. The purpose of this exercise is to find a ratio 
between simulated and observed landings. If both are under- or overestimated, the estimated 
ratio between them will still be close to the real parameter. Thus, for the use in this paper this 
is irrelevant, as the ratio is used to correct individual boats catches. 
In the dataset, landings are an aggregate of landings in Russia, Norway, Iceland, the EU and 
any other nations landing cod. Only a proportion of the landings are done by Norwegian 
fishers. Thus, it is not fair to say that a difference between real and simulated landings come 
from a change in Norwegian policies only. Nevertheless, this simplification has to be done in 
order to proceed with the simulation. 
3.4 Simulation of the stock 
3.4.1 Recruitment 
Recruitment is estimated as a relationship with the biomass of the spawning fish. One 
standard way to describe this is the Beverton-Holt relationship (Beverton and Holt, 1957, p 
                                                 
19 See Bogstad et.al. (2007, p 662), for a discussion of dynamics of access to food and cannibalism for cod. 
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49). Recruitment is defined as the number of three year olds, and ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ is defined as the 
Spawning Stock Biomass three years earlier. The Beverton-Holt relationship is then  
ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧ ൌ 	ܽ ∗ ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ ሺ1 ൅ ܾ ∗ ܵܵܤ௧ିଷሻ⁄ 													ሺ3. 3ሻ 
The relationship is steep at start, and then flattens. This is justified by cod’s enormous 
amounts of eggs. A small stock of fish can produce a large amount of recruits. But as the 
number of egg laying individuals grows, environmental conditions such as food and space 
cause the marginal Recruitment to approach zero. Recruitment thus asymptotically 
approaches a/b. a and b are estimated on the whole dataset, 1949-2009, in order to get the best 
possible estimates.   
Using the dataset described in section 3.3 and plotting observed Recruitment against SSB 
three years earlier:   
 
Figure 4: Beverton-Holt. Number and Tons. 
Figure 4 plots the observed ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧	against		ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ	. Using the observations in blue, 
the non-linear relationship in equation (3.3) is estimated. ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧	is then predicted, and 
shown as the red line. As one can see from the observations, there is greater variability in 
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Recruitment for smaller stocks of cod. This is an indication that when the stock is small, 
environmental conditions have more to say for Recruitment.  
3.4.2 Landings 
Landings are estimated as a relationship between ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧		and		ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܤ݅݋݉ܽݏݏ௧. Testing 
several relationships, it turned out that landings were highly correlated with the stock of cod 
the year before (see Appendix 3.1). Defining ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ as the ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܤ݅݋݉ܽݏݏ௧	lagged one 
year, the estimated relationship is 
ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ   (3.4) 
 
Using observations in the years 1960-1989 from the dataset described in section 3.3 and 
plotting observed Landings against TBM the year before are shown in Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5: Landings against TBM the year before. Tons. 
As one can see from Figure 5, this relationship is quite consistent, and has good properties. 
Figure 6 show the resulting predicted landings: 
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Figure 6: Landings, Predicted and Observed 1960-2005. Red vertical lines mark 1978 and 1990. Tons. 
As follows from Figure 6, over time the prediction for landings is quite good, and better for 
the period 1978-1990 than before. This justifies the assumption that the landings observed in 
the 1980s would have continued from 1990, had there not been a change in policy (see 
Appendix 3.1 for properties of the residuals.) 
Equation (3.4) is a key equation in the simulation. By estimating the parameters for the years 
1960-1989 and using them in the simulation of the actual stock, it is possible to see how the 
stock could have developed if the quota regime had not been put in place. Technological 
change is assumed to be very small in this period.20 Remember from section 2.1.1 that 
technology is represented in the Harvest Function by the parameter e. This is in other words 
kept unchanged in the analysis. 
Regressing the equation for the pre 1990 era, the parameters tell us how high the landings 
were in the years of relatively unconstrained fisheries. In the simulation, this relationship is 
carried forward. The parameters tell us how high landings could have been in post 1990, 
                                                 
20 Hanneson et.al. (2010) describes the technological development in the post WW2 era as less marked than it 
had been before. However, this is a simplification. Technological change happened, but with lower marginal 
utility in the fisheries. 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Predicted Landings Observed Landings
Predicted and Observed
Landings 1960-2005
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assuming the same technology and structure of the fleet as in the years before. As discussed 
earlier, the structure of the fleet changed, and naturally technology got better, but for this 
purpose it is simplified away. 
The simulation thus starts with the estimation of landings in 1990: 
ܵ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏଵଽଽ଴ ൌ ܮܽ݊݀ଓ݊݃ݏଵଽଽ଴෣ ൌ	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯଵଽ଼ଽ  (3.5) 
3.4.3 Adjusting Fishing Mortality 
The Simulated Landings are used to adjust the Fishing Mortality, which affect the 		ܶܤܯ௧ and 
ܵܵܤ௧.  
ܨ݅ݏ݄݅݊݃	ܯ݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௔	,௧ ൌ ܨܯ௔	,௧  is provided in the data, as a parameter of growth. If 
ܰܽݐݑݎ݈ܽ	ܯ݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௧ ൌ 0, the % that dies in a cohort each year is given by (Clark, 1976, p 
271-272):  
ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	%	݀ݕ݅݊݃௔,௧ ൎ ሺ1 െ ݁ிெೌ	,೟ሻ     (3.6) 
In the following, this is treated with strict equality. 
By introducing  
ݔ௧ ൌ 	ܵ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧/ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧      (3.7) 
it is possible to adjust the %	݀ݕ݅݊݃ up or down, so that a higher value of counterfactual 
landings than observed cause higher counterfactual Fishing Mortality. Define			ܨܯ෢ ௔	,௧ ൌ
ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܨ݅ݏ݄݅݊݃	ܯ݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௔,௧. ܨܯ෢ ௔	,௧ follow implicitly from:  
ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	%	݀ݕ݅݊݃௔,௧ ൌ ൫1 െ ݁ிெ෢ ೌ	,೟൯ ൌ ݔ௧ ∗ ሺ1 െ ݁ிெೌ,೟ሻ 						ൌ
						ሺܵ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧/ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧ሻ ∗ ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	%	݀ݕ݅݊݃௔,௧      (3.8) 
Solve for	ܨܯ෢ ௔	,௧	, and get: 
ܨܯ෢ ௔	,௧ ൌ 	െ݈݊ൣ1 െ ݔ௧ ∗ ൫1 െ ݁ݔ݌ൣെܨܯ௔	,௧൧൯൧       (3.9) 
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This is the adjusted Fishing Mortality for each cohort, for each year. As seen in equation 
(3.5), Landings in 1990 were simulated. Thus, equation (3.7) gives ݔ௧ 	് 1		from 1990.  By 
setting t=1990, equation (3.9) gives: 
ܨܯ෢ ௔	,ଵଽଽ଴ ൌ 	െ݈݊ൣ1 െ ݔଵଽଽ଴ ∗ ൫1 െ ݁ݔ݌ൣെܨܯ௔	,ଵଽଽ଴൧൯൧  (3.9’) 
Thus, if Simulated Landings are higher than observed Landings in 1990, Fishing Mortality is 
higher for each cohort. 
It is implicitly assumed here that higher landings cause higher mortality for each cohort, and 
in the same proportion on each cohort. This is a simplification, but it is justifiable. No fisher 
would increase his mesh size or alter other gear to catch larger fish, as this would mean less 
landed fish. For a discussion of this, see Diekert (2011).  
3.4.4 Adjusted Number of Fish 
One can calculate how many fish survive from year to year through the formula (Clark, 1976, 
p 272) 
ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݂݅ݏ݄	of	age	a	at	time	t ൌ 	 ௔ܰ,௧ ൌ	
	 ௔ܰିଵ,௧ିଵ ∗ ݁ݔ݌ሺെܰܯ௧ିଵ െ ܨܯ௔ିଵ,௧ିଵሻ           (3.10) 
For example, for 1990, this means that the number of four year olds is: 
ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݂݅ݏ݄	of	age	4	in	1990 ൌ 	 ସܰ,ଵଽଽ଴	
ൌ 	 	 ଷܰ,ଵଽ଼ଽ ∗ ݁ݔ݌ሺെܰܯଷ,ଵଽ଼ଽ െ ܨܯଷ,ଵଽ଼ଽሻ        (3.10’) 
By using equations (3.5), (3.7) and (3.9) in (3.10), it is possible to simulate the number of fish 
in each cohort every year, given only fishing mortality, natural mortality and number of fish 
in the cohort when it was three years old. An example is: 
ହܰ,௧ ൌ 	 	 ସܰ,௧ିଵ ∗ ݁ݔ݌൫െܰܯ௧ିଵ െ ܨܯସ,௧ିଵ൯	
ൌ 	 ଷܰ,௧ିଶ ∗ ݁ݔ݌൫െܰܯ௧ିଶ െ ܨܯଷ,௧ିଶ൯ ∗ ݁ݔ݌൫െܰܯ௧ିଵ െ ܨܯସ,௧ିଵ൯     (3.11) 
From equation (3.9) it is clear that once Simulated Landings are used instead of Observed, 
Fishing Mortality have to be adjusted. This affects equation (3.10), ܨܯ௔ିଵ,௧ିଵ	have to be 
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replaced with	ܨܯ෢ ௔ିଵ	,௧ିଵ	 in order to get a simulated number of fish. Replace (3.10) in 
equation (3.10) and get the ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݂݅ݏ݄	݅݊	݄݁ܽܿ	ܿ݋݄݋ݎݐ ൌ 	 ෡ܰ௔	,௧		: 
௔ܰ,௧෢ ൌ 	 	 ௔ܰିଵ,௧ିଵ ∗ ݁ݔ݌ሺെܰܯ௧ିଵ െ 	ܨܯ෢ ௔ିଵ	,௧ିଵ	ሻ       (3.12) 
Again, for four year olds in 1990: 
ସܰ,ଵଽଽ଴෣ ൌ	 	 ଷܰ,ଵଽ଼ଽ ∗ ݁ݔ݌൫െܰܯଷ,ଵଽ଼ଽ െ 	ܨܯ෢ ଷ	,ଵଽ଼ଽ	൯ 										ൌ
												 ଷܰ,ଵଽ଼ଽ ∗ ݁ݔ݌൫െܰܯଷ,ଵଽ଼ଽ െ ܨܯଷ	,ଵଽ଼ଽ	൯ ൌ 	 ସܰ	,ଵଽଽ଴      (3.12’) 
A crucial assumption in the simulation is that within a given year all Recruitment happens 
before landings. Thus, as seen from the second line in this example, one gets the same number 
of four year olds as in the observed case. Fishing Mortality is not adjusted in 1989, but only 
from 1990. For all years after 1990 Fishing Mortality is adjusted. For later use, the number of 
four-year olds in 1991 is:  
ସܰ,ଵଽଽଵ෣ ൌ	 	 ଷܰ,ଵଽଽ଴ ∗ ݁ݔ݌ሺെܰܯଷ,ଵଽଽ଴ െ 	ܨܯ෢ ଷ	,ଵଽଽ଴	ሻ      (3.12’’) 
3.4.5 Adjusted SSB and Recruitment 
As stated in equation (3.2), ܵܵܤ௧	is given by 
ܵܵܤ௧ ൌ ∑ ௔ܰ,௧ ∗ ܣ ௔ܹ,௧ଵଷା௔ୀଷ ∗ ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	ܯܽݐݑݎ݁௔,௧ ൌ
	 ଷܰ,௧ ∗ ܣ ଷܹ,௧ ∗ ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	ܯܽݐݑݎ݁ଷ,௧ ൅	 ସܰ,௧ ∗ ܣ ସܹ,௧ ∗ ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	ܯܽݐݑݎ݁ସ,௧ + …+ 
ଵܰଷା	,௧ ∗ ܣ ଵܹଷା	,௧ ∗ ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	ܯܽݐݑݎ݁ଵଷା		,௧       (3.2) 
The relationship between different cohorts in equation (3.11) is exploited to calculate the 
simulated	ܵܵܤ௧	using the number of recruits in each year before. As seen from equation 
(3.12), the numbers of fish in the simulation have to be adjusted, so that equation (3.2) turn 
into: 
ܵܵܤ௧෣ ൌ ∑ ௔ܰ,௧෢ ∗ ܣ ௔ܹ,௧ଵଷା௔ୀଷ ∗ ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁	ܯܽݐݑݎ݁௔,௧      (3.13) 
Thus, it is clear that a change from observed to simulated landings affect SSB through a 
change in fishing mortality. Average Weight and Percentage Mature are not assumed to 
change, as these are mainly affected by year-specific biological variations.  
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As known from equation (3.12’) and (3.12’’), ௔ܰ,௧ is not affected by the change from 
simulated to observed landings until 1991. Thus, equation (3.13) will return the observed 
values of	ܵܵܤଵଽଽ଴. 	ܵܵܤଵଽଽଵ	is affected, since ௔ܰ,ଵଽଽଵ෣ 	is affected by simulated landings in 
1990. 
But the number of recruits is also affected by the change in landings. From the Beverton-Holt 
relationship in equation (3.3): 
ଷܰ,௧ ൌ ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧ 	ൌ 	 ௔∗ௌௌ஻೟షయଵା௕∗ௌௌ஻೟షయ      (3.14) 
Since SSB is not affected by the change from simulated to observed landings until 1991, 
(3.14) will return the observed Recruitment in the years 1990-1993. For example,  
ଷܰ,ଵଽଽଷ 	ൌ 	 ܽ ∗ ܵܵܤଵଽଽ଴1 ൅ ܾ ∗ ܵܵܤଵଽଽ଴ 						ሺ3. 14′ሻ 
For 1994, and all subsequent years, however, SSB is affected by the change in landings and 
will return		ܥ݋݊ݐݎܽ	݂ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ	݈݁ݒ݈݁	݋݂	ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൌ 	 ଷܰ,௧	തതതതതത	: 
ଷܰ,௧തതതതത 	ൌ 	 ܽ ∗ ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ
෣
1൅ ܾ ∗ ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ෣ 					ሺ3. 14′′ሻ 
Example for 1994: 
ଷܰ,ଵଽଽସതതതതതതതതത 	ൌ 	 ܽ ∗ ܵܵܤଵଽଽଵ
෣
1൅ ܾ ∗ ܵܵܤଵଽଽଵ෣ 					ሺ3. 14′′′ሻ 
Thus, the counterfactual number of recruits found in (3.14’’) replaces the observed number of 
recruits in equation (3.8) in the years 1994-2005. For the years 1990-1993, observed values 
are used.  
To sum up: two effects affect the simulation of SSB in the years 1990-2005. The first is the 
change in fishing mortality for all cohorts. The second is the effect from a change in 
Recruitment. 
It might not be clear at this point why so much effort is laid down in simulating SSB and 
Recruitment, but as one can see, it is necessary to simulate SSB in order to simulate 
Recruitment, which is needed to calculate Total biomass. Since SSB and Recruitment affect 
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each other from year to year, it is needed to simulate them simultaneously for the whole 
period in question. 
3.4.6 Yearly variations in environmental conditions 
For a given year, there is a real value of the Spawning Stock Biomass, and a real value of 
Recruitment. Their relation is described in the Beverton-Holt relationship, which use 
parameters a and b to take the environment for Recruitment into account. This relationship is 
in reality year-specific, and includes the temperature in the water, access to food, conditions 
in the areas of spawning etc.  
Again, the purpose of this exercise is to find a ratio between counterfactual and observed 
landings. In order to find the counterfactual landings, counterfactual total biomass is needed, 
where the only change from factuality is that the quota regime is not implemented in 1990. 
All other conditions should remain as in the factual process. There were years with good and 
bad environmental conditions in the period 1990-2005, and this would have been the same 
with no quota regime. Thus, when simulating the Recruitment in a given year, a year-specific 
Beverton-Holt curve should be used. This way it is possible to replace the observed value of 
ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ  in the Beverton-Holt relationship with the simulated value	ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ෣ , and get back a 
simulated value for Recruitment. By simulating the counterfactual Recruitment with adjusted 
coefficients a and b, the Total biomass is simulated conditional on the estimated conditions 
for Recruitment observed from 1990.  
Ideally, there would be a value of a and b for each year, so that changing the SSB would 
return the number of recruits that would have grown up under the given conditions. However, 
to change both parameters, two equations with the a and b would be needed for each year. 
This would only be a possibility if two values of ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ	and 	ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧	where observed 
each year. 
Since this is not the case, b is kept constant, and the yearly variations are summed up in ܽ௧. 
This is not perfect, but it is a mathematical approximation that does not give too high errors. 
ܽ௧ is calculated for each year, using observed values on ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧ and ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ, by 
solving the Beverton-Holt relationship for a: 
ܽ௧ ൌ ܴ݁ܿݎݑ݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ௧ ∗ ൬1 ൅ ܾ ∗ ܵܵܤ௧ିଷܵܵܤ௧ିଷ ൰					ሺ3. 15ሻ 
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Thus, it is possible to use the calculated values of ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ, ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ෣  in the Beverton-Holt in 
order to estimate Recruitment: 
ଷܰ,௧തതതതത 	ൌ 	 ܽ௧ ∗ ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ
෣
1൅ ܾ ∗ ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ෣ 						ሺ3. 16ሻ 
ܵܵܤ௧ିଷ	is not available until 1949, since the dataset starts in 1946. a and b are estimated on 
the largest possible dataset, 1949-2009, in order to get the best possible estimates.  ܽ௧	is then 
calculated according to equation (3.15) for the years 1990-2005. Higher values indicate better 
environmental conditions. 
3.4.7 Simulated Total biomass and Landings 
Employing the same way of thinking as on		ܵܵܤ௧ in section 3.4.5, it is possible to simulate the 
values of Total biomass. Number of fish is affected by the change in landings, and 
Recruitment is simulated from 1994. Thus, Total biomass is calculated using the equation 
ܶܤܯ௧෣ ൌ	෍ ௔ܰ,௧෢ ∗ ܣ ௔ܹ,௧
ଵଷା
௔ୀଷ
									ሺ3. 17ሻ 
Average Weight is not assumed to change, as this is mainly affected by year-specific 
biological variations. As with SSB, observed values of Recruitment is used for 1990-1993, 
and simulated for 1994-2005. 
As known from equation (3.4), Landings is a function of Total biomass the year before. 
Simulated values for landings are based on the simulated values for Total biomass. From 
equation (3.5): 
	ܮܽ݊݀ଓ݊݃ݏ௧෣ ൌ	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ	ሺ3. 18ሻ 
Since	ܶܤܯ௧	 is simulated from 1990; equation (3.18) is only used to simulate landings in 
1990. From 1991, simulated values of ܶܤܯ௧	is used: 
ܮܽ݊݀ଓ݊݃ݏ௧෣ ൌ	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ෣ 			ሺ3. 19ሻ 
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3.4.8 Increasing error terms 
In this setup, the error term grows each year. A small error in the estimation of landings in 
1990 will make the estimation for 1991 more insecure, and so on. However, this will be the 
fact no matter what simulation is used, and the results produced will the best guess of the 
counterfactual landings.  
3.5 Results 
Simulating as described, the following results are obtained. Blue line is always simulated 
values, red is observed. 
3.5.1 Total Biomass 
 
Figure 7: Total Biomass 1949-2005. Tons. 
Figure 7 show that the Total biomass grew in the early 1990s, fell each year to 2000, and then 
grew again. Figure 7 show that the simulated stock of cod reach a historically low level in the 
years after 2000. 
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The simulation returns a lower path of Total biomass than what was observed, i.e. the 
counterfactual total biomass would have been lower than the factual if no quota regime had 
been implemented. This is consistent with theory if quotas where the limiting constraint on 
fishing. It is also seen from the graph that both observed and simulated values dropped in the 
period 1993-2000. While the observed stock later picked up, the simulated stabilized on a 
quite low level. But, one should be careful to draw conclusions; the margin of error grows 
each year. 
 
 
3.5.2 Landings 
 
Figure 8: Landings 1949-2005. Tons. 
Figure 8 shows the historical context of the simulated landings. Simulated Landings are 
higher than observed in the years immediately after 1990. In the long run, they approach the 
actual level of landings in the «crises year» 1989. This is consistent with lower simulated 
Total biomass; a higher proportion of the fish is caught each year, and thus the simulated 
stock is lower than the observed. From 1992 this leads to lower absolute Landings. As seen 
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from Figure 8, the simulated landings fall below the observed after only a few years, and stay 
lower for the rest of the period. 
3.6 Adjusted Landings for Individual Fisher 
In section 4 a dataset containing data on landings for individual fishers is described. In order 
to adjust the landings to get counterfactual landings, the following equation will be used in 
section 5 (in order to not get confused,  ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ is called	ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ	in equation 
(3.20)): 
ܥ݋݊ݐݎܽ	݂ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧
ൌ 	 ܵ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀	ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧
∗ ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧						ሺ3. 20ሻ 
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4 Individual Data on Boats Economy 
The dataset used contain individual data on Norwegian coastal fishers. It is obtained from the 
Directorate of Fisheries, and is gathered from the Profitability Survey.21 Details on the survey 
are obtained from different surveys as well as the webpage of the Directorate of Fisheries.22 If 
no source is mentioned, the information is taken directly from the dataset. 
The purpose of the survey is stated in the subtitle: “for common well run and well equipped 
vessels larger than 8 meters, fishing all year”, (Survey, 1999, front page; own translation). In 
the period 1985-1997 the survey was self sampling; fishers was encouraged, but not forced to 
participate. The survey has might therefore be seen as a survey covering all boats, but with a 
large dropout rate. From 1998 all boats were first stratified according to group, length and 
homeport. Then the boats were stratified according to revenue, so that more boats are picked 
from the high earners. And at last the sample was randomly chosen from each stratum. The 
survey covers very few boats in Group 2, those without quota (Survey, 2012, p 87). 
The dataset contain 3009 observations over 21 fishing seasons. Figure 9 show the number of 
observations for each size class of vessels: 
 
Figure 9: Number of Observations each year, by length of vessel.  
                                                 
21 NOR: Lønnsomhetundersøkelsen 
22 Points to Directorate of Fisheries web-page, retrieved on January 31st 2012. In the following, this is just 
referred to as “Web”. See Literature for the complete link. 
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Figure 9 indicates that the number of observations in each group seldom is very many; the 
straight turquoise line is 30 observations. Prior to 2002, there are no boats less than 13 meters, 
as these were treated in a separate survey. These are excluded in the analysis. A large part of 
the boats are fishing solely for demersal fish. 
The variables year and identification make it possible to analyse the data with panel data 
tools. The boats are given an industry code; identifying them as for ex. Pelagic coastal fisher 
below 10 meters. 
4.1 Variables 
Revenue is the sum of income to the boat. This consists of revenue from fishing and other 
activities. Subsidies are included in this, and not listed as a separate variable. In the years 
1985-1986 direct subsidies for operation are included in revenues. In other years other 
subsidy are included, but it is not known when and in what magnitude (Tove Aasheim, direct 
communication) This is a source of error later, since revenue is used to measure profitability. 
The boats are often run in a share system; the fishermen split the revenue, after some basic 
costs are paid. This gives the fishermen the incentives to work hard. If revenue is only the 
share to the skipper, obviously revenue would have been a bad measure of income, as 
discussed in McConnell and Price (2005). In this dataset this is not a problem, as revenue to 
the boat is reported. 
Many different costs are included. These include input such as fuel and wages, taxes and 
financial costs. Capital per se is not reported. Net Finance,23 which is the net of financial 
revenue and costs, is the only reported value. In the years 1988-1992 and 1999-2000 this 
includes subsidies to pay of interest. 
Volume and value of landings are given for nine species. 
Measures of effort include the days at sea and number of men. These will later be used to 
explain profitability. 
4.2 Measures of Profitability 
                                                 
23 NOR: Nettofinans 
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Three measures of profitability are used later. These are defined in the Survey (2012, p 94), 
along with measures not used here. 
The first is profits, which is simply revenue minus costs. These values are adjusted for 
inflation using CPI with value 100 in 1998. 
The second is Profit margin. The Profit Margin is the Profit divided by the Revenue: 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ	݉ܽݎ݃݅݊ ൌ ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ∗ 100							ሺ4. 1ሻ 
Thus, the Profit margin show how many NOK the fishers earn for each 100 NOK they receive 
in revenue. 
Wage-ability24 is another measure of profitability; by withdrawing all cost and a standard 
interest to capital from revenue, a residual sum that hypothetically could be paid in wages is 
obtained. 
                                                 
24 NOR: Lønnsevne 
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5 Counterfactual Prices 
5.1 Why? 
In section 3 the counterfactual development of the stock was described. By making some 
assumptions about the landings of cod, it was shown how the landings and the stock could 
have developed without a quota regime. 
The purpose of this section is to show the possible development in prices that would have 
occurred without a quota regime. In section 6 both these simulated and observed prices are 
used to calculate counterfactual profit margins. 
In this section the simulation made in section 3 is not questioned. Section 5.2 develop 
adjusted mean price and section 5.3 use this to adjust the price received by the individual 
fisher. 
5.2 Adjusting Mean Prices 
5.2.1 Mean Prices and Inflation 
In the dataset described in section 4, there are year-specific data on each boats’ landed volume 
and received payment for different species. Prices are found by dividing received payment by 
volume, for each fisher. By averaging this for all fishers within a given year, a mean price of 
cod is returned for each year. In order to make a comparison between years, this mean price is 
adjusted for inflation.25 This is defined as Price Adjusted for Inflation, PAI. 
5.2.2 Regressing prices on landings 
For use in section 5.2.3 a regression of PAI on observed landings is done. The model is: 
ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܲܣܫ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ							ሺ5. 1ሻ 
                                                 
25 Data on inflation in Norway is obtained from the web-page of Statistics Norway, see Literature for full link. 
Standard CPI is used, with a base of 100 in 1998. 
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Nothing is known about demand for cod, and what are known from the data are only the 
prices and landings caused by supply and demand. In equation (5.1) however, static demand 
is implicitly assumed. This is a simplification, as not all observations are drawn from a single 
year. It is necessary to make conclusions about the market for cod. 
The data on landings is the same as in section 3. This might be a source of error in this 
approach, as the prices stem from landings of all types of cod in Norway, while the data on 
landings are on a specific species of cod, landed in all countries. However, this error should 
not be too big, as there is major overlap between landings of NEA cod and aggregate landings 
of cod in Norway. 
Results of the regression are shown in Table 1: 
xtreg Inf_price observed_Landings , fe 
 Estimate Standard Error t-value 
Constant 12.91897 0.137361 94.05 
Observed 
Landings 
-0.00000583 -2.43e-07 -23.97 
R-squared 0.1832 
Prob > F 0.0003 
Rho (fraction of variance 
due to u_i) 
0.43144 
Table 1: Regressing PAI on Observed Landings. Price is adjusted for inflation. 
As seen in Table 1 the results on steepness and constant term seem robust. The R-squared is 
low, but the marginal effect is what matters, and this is very significant. 
5.2.3 Counterfactual Price 
In equation 5.1 and in Table 1, the main trend in the relationship between landings and price 
is described. ߚଵ	= (-)-0.00000583, so when the landings increase by 100000 tons, the PAI falls 
by 0.581 NOK. This is reasonable; more fish on the market should lead to lower prices.  
The counterfactual PAI is found by replacing observed landings with simulated landings in 
equation (5.1) and using the estimates for 	ߚ଴		and ߚଵ: 
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ܥ݋݊ݐݎܽ	ܨܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܲܣܫ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ܵ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ ∗ ߚଵ 	ൌ 
12.91897 ൅ ܵ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ ∗ ሺെሻ0.00000583			ሺ5. 2ሻ 
Results of this procedure are shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10: PAI over time, Observed and Counterfactual. Price adjusted for inflation. 
From Figure 10 it is seem like prices behave like a mirror image of the landings - compare to 
Figure 8. For the observed case, landings increased in the early 1990s, peaked in 1997, and 
then fell. The opposite is seen for the price. 
Simulated landings are higher than observed in the early 1990s, and counterfactual prices are 
lower than observed. When the simulated landings stabilize/fall slightly from 1997, the 
counterfactual prices do to, and stay on the same level for the rest of the period. 
These simulated prices are used in section 5.3 to adjust the price to the fisher. The 
counterfactual price is adjusted from real to nominal. The counterfactual nominal price from 
this section is then called ܥ݋݊ݐݎܽ	݂ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܰ݋݈݉݅݊ܽ	ܯ݁ܽ݊	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁	 and observed price is 
called		ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܰ݋݈݉݅݊ܽ	ܯ݁ܽ݊	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁. 
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5.3 Adjusting price to the Fisher 
For later use in the analysis of profits, counterfactual price to fisher is needed. Therefore, 
these prices are adjusted using the adjusted mean prices. In order to adjust, the following 
equation is used: 
ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁	ݐ݋	ܨ݅ݏ݄݁ݎ	
ൌ 	 ൬ܥ݋݊ݐݎܽ	݂ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܰ݋݈݉݅݊ܽ	ܯ݁ܽ݊	ܲݎܱܾ݅ܿ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܰ݋݈݉݅݊ܽ	ܯ݁ܽ݊	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൰ ∗ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁	ݐ݋	ܨ݅ݏ݄݁ݎ					ሺ5. 3ሻ 
Thus, the prices to the fisher are adjusted up or down in proportion with the difference 
between counterfactual and observed mean prices. The result is shown in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11: Adjusted Price to fisher. Nominal NOK. 
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6 Counterfactual Profits 
This section draws on the data described in section 4 to describe the development in fishers’ 
profitability. The simulations of landings in section 3 and prices in section 5 are used to 
simulate how the profits could have developed. 
6.1 Observed Values 
6.1.1 Revenue, Costs and Profit 
Observed average values of revenue, costs and profit are shown in Figure 12.The values are 
adjusted for inflation.  
 
Figure 12: Observed Revenue, Costs and Profit. Adjusted for inflation. Red vertical line mark 1989. NOK in 1998. 
As seen from Figure 12, the revenue and costs increased slightly in the period 1985-1997. 
“Good times” might be said to be 1997-2002, because revenues increased sharply in these 
years. Costs do not increase as much as the revenue and this created profits. Profits are close 
to zero in the period 1985-1990, but increase slightly in the period after. This is an indication 
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that the quotas actually limited the access to the fishery and increased the profits for those still 
fishing. 
6.1.2 Profit Margins 
Profit margin is a measure of how well the fishers are doing, regardless of inflation and the 
size of revenue and costs. 
Figure 13 shows observed average profit margins for the years 1985-2005: 
 
Figure 13: Observed Profit margin. Red vertical line mark 1989, horizontal 0%. Percentage. 
From Figure 13 it is evident that profit margins increased dramatically in the period. From 
1985 to 1994, the average varied below and around zero. 1992 is the first year it is positive, 
and from 1994 it stayed positive. This is another indication that the quota regime caused an 
increase in profitability in the fisheries. 
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It is quite stunning how many years the average fisher made a loss. One thing that could be 
interesting is to look at separate data on subsidies and its part in revenues. But since subsidies 
are not included as a separate variable, this is not possible. 
6.1.3 Did quotas Cause Profits? 
As discussed in 2.2, when a quota regime is introduced, profits should increase over time. 
Figure 14 show that high landings partly co-vary high profit margins. It seems like the overall 
trend in both is positive in the period 1985-2000, but after this landings fall much sharper than 
profit margins. 
 
Figure 14: Profit margins and landings. Red vertical lines mark 1989 and 2000, horizontal 0%. Percentage on the left axis, 
Tons on the right. 
An interesting comparison between Figure 12 and Figure 14 is that “good times” in terms of 
revenue actually does not vary perfectly with the variation in landings. Landings increased a 
few years before the revenues did, and they declined before revenues did. This is caused by 
the variation in prices. 
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This theoretical approach does not count in external factors. If good environmental conditions 
make the stock grow fast, the landings and profits will increase with or without a quota 
regime. A measure of environmental conditions is the parameter “a” from section 3. Figure 15 
show that the landings and environmental conditions three years earlier are practically 
detached. This is an indication that something else caused the high landings – perhaps the 
quotas. 
 
Figure 15: Landings and Environmental conditions. Tons on the left axis, a on the right. 
6.1.4 Did the Fishers Trade in Quotas? 
One explanation for the stabilization of profit margins can be that the quota regime was well 
established in 2000, and perhaps had evolved into an ITQ regime as discussed in section 
2.3.3. If this was the case, the fall in landings could lead to sales of quotas from those who 
could not manage to make profit under the worse times, to those who could. Thus, the profit 
margin for those in the fishery could stay at the same level. 
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Profit margins as a measure of profitability disregard the fact that the quotas had to be 
purchased. Since the Directorate of Fisheries does not measure the value of quotas, a purchase 
will show as a pure financial loss. Data on capital has not been acquired from the Directorate. 
But a way of looking into this is to look at the development in Net Finance. This is the net of 
financial income and cost. If trade in quotas occurred Net Finance should drop, since the 
sellers fall out of the dataset. 
Figure 16 show that Net Financial actually fell in the period 1997-2001, indicating that the 
fishers actually invested harder in this period. However, it is quite speculative to say that this 
increased investment was in quotas, and that the purchases of quotas again lead to more 
robust profit margins for those staying in the fishery.  
 
Figure 16: Net Finance and Interest rate. Red vertical line mark 2000. NOK on the left axis, Percentage on the right. 
Variations in Net Finance can also be caused by other investments. But a major driver behind 
the costs of capital is real interest rate. If this co-varies well with Net Finance, one could 
argue that there was no increase in investments that caused the higher cost of capital, just 
increased interest rates. 
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The development in real interest rates is also shown in Figure 16. This is based on the interest 
in the States bank for Fishers and CPI. It does not seem co-vary with Net Finance. If anything, 
real interest seems to fall in the period of the supposed investment in quotas. This would 
make it cheaper to buy quotas. But on the overall, the two are so detached that it is not 
possible to conclude with this. Thus, this argument may support that trade in quotas occurred 
1997-2001. 
6.2 Simulated Revenue and Costs 
In this section, profits are simulated. Four alternative simulations are presented. Revenues can 
be calculated with observed or simulated prices, and Costs can be adjusted for changes in 
effort or not. Landings are anyway simulated, so even if prices and costs are kept as observed, 
the simulations will get different results than the observed profit. 
6.2.1 Adjusted Revenue 
In section 3.6 the counterfactual landings of cod for the individual fisher is calculated. This is 
multiplied with the simulated price from section 5.3 or observed price in order to get 
counterfactual value of landed cod. Both things are done, so it is possible to see what effects 
is has on profits. Then counterfactual value of landed cod is added with the value of all other 
fish landed.  
Value of all landings and revenue is not always the same. Fishers also have other income. 
Therefore revenue has to be calculated. This is done with two different methods, which affect 
the simulated revenue in different ways. 
The first method is adding the difference between adjusted and observed total value of 
landings to revenue: 
ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁
ൌ ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ൅ ሺܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	݋݂	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ
െ ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	݋݂	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏሻ		ሺ6. 2ሻ 
This method does not adjust the value of other income. For real activities, like taking tourists 
on a cruise, this is good. There is no reason this should vary with the amount of cod in the sea.  
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The question is how subsidies would have behaved under the counterfactual case. This is a 
cause of error in the	ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁	, but it is probably not too big. As discussed in 
section 2.3.6, subsidies largely disappeared in the 1990s.  
The second method is increasing all revenue in the proportion of the change in value of 
landings: 
ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ൌ 	 ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	݋݂	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܸ݈ܽݑ݁	݋݂	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ ∗ ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁	ሺ6. ૜ሻ 
This method adjusts the value of all activity of the fisher. For real activities this is not good. 
But if the difference between observed and adjusted landings stem from underreporting of the 
value of the landed fish, this method takes it into account.  
Results of the second method seem less trustworthy. They are not discussed in the text, but 
are shown in Appendix 6.1. In the following, adjusted revenue and simulated prices refer to 
the first method. Observed prices refer to the same method, using observed prices. 
6.2.2 Adjusted Costs 
Costs are divided into fixed and those depending on the activity. Higher or lower landings 
should lead to a proportionate change in variable costs. These are adjusted in the following 
way: First, the volume of landings of cod is replaced with its simulated value, see section 3.6. 
This is added to the quantity of landings of other species. Then the variable costs are adjusted 
proportionally: 
ܣ݆ݑݏݐ݁݀	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁	ܿ݋ݏݐ
ൌ 	 ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁	݋݂	݈ܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁	݋݂	݈ܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ ∗ ܱܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀	ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁	ܿ݋ݏݐ			ሺ6. 4ሻ 
Finally, adjusted total cost is calculated as the sum of fixed costs and the adjusted variable 
costs. In the following, this result is referred to as adjusted costs. Observed costs are the total 
costs reported in the dataset. 
Under the assumption that costs are adjusted, it is implicitly assumed that effort is adjusted. 
Effort, measured in days in operation and days at sea, can obviously not increase above 365 
days in a year. In order to see if simulated effort is within reason, the adjusted number of days 
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at sea is calculated in the same way as adjusted costs in equation (6.4). This reveals that in no 
year the average effort is simulated to be more than 126 days at sea, which must be all right. 
6.3 Simulated Profits 
Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 give two opportunities each for the simulation of profit: using 
simulated or observed prices in calculating the revenue, and using simulated or observed 
costs. Landings are always simulated. 
When simulating these different measures, one should take into account that the error terms 
grow each year. This stem mainly from the simulation of landings, since each year of 
predictions is based on the one the year before. Thus, a small error at the start can propagate 
through the whole time series of landings. This again can cause disturbances to the calculation 
of prices, revenues, costs and in the end profit. 
Figure 17 show these four different simulations of profit. All the values are adjusted for 
inflation. Beforehand, 127 observations with profit margins lower than 100% were dropped in 
order to make more sound graphs. 
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Figure 17: Profit, observed and simulated. Adjusted for inflation. Red vertical line marks 1989. NOK in 1998. 
Figure 17 show that the profits take on quite different values. Starting on top in 2005, 
observed profits are highest. Then comes the two cases of adjusted costs, first adjusted and 
then observed prices. And at the bottom observed costs, first adjusted and then observed 
prices. All in all, observed profits seem to be highest with a good margin. 
6.3.1 Effort-effects 
The two cases using observed costs need some discussion. The case with adjusted prices in 
the calculation of the revenues is shown in orange in Figure 17, observed prices in purple. In 
1990 both are higher than observed profits, shown in blue. Then they show a negative trend 
for many years. After 1990 the average observed profit is 131948 NOK (1998). The 
comparing figures for the case with adjusted prices is (-) 237878 and (-) 315466 for observed 
prices. 
In order to explain this, one has to remember that the revenues are based on counterfactual 
landings in all simulations. As seen from Figure 8 in section 3.5.2, simulated landings are 
larger than observed in 1990-1993 and lower in every year after. If observed prices are used to 
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simulate the revenues, it is obvious that the simulated profits are deviating from the observed. 
The fisher is getting the same price, and spending the same money catching it, but delivering 
more than observed in 1990-1993 and less after. Figure 17 show that the effect on profits 
from keeping the observed costs is large. The same case with simulated prices, shown in 
orange does not deviate much from the case with observed prices.  
Now consider the two cases with adjusted costs as one, and the two with observed costs as 
one. The latter is higher at start, but lower from 1993. This is the effort-effect. Judging on the 
distance between the lines, this is the most important effect. Adjusting the prices –in effect, 
simulating the market - does not matter as much as adjusting the costs. 
This is a reasonable result, as the cases where observed costs are used in effect deny the 
fishers to limit their effort in bad times and to increase it in good ones. This makes a strong 
case for considering the two cases where the effort is adjusted more seriously than the two 
where it is not. Market-effects are discussed in the next section. 
6.4 Simulated Profit margin 
If only the cases with adjusted costs are considered, only adjustment of prices separates the 
simulations. Figure 18 show the observed profit margin and these two simulations, in colors 
corresponding to the ones in Figure 17. The simulation with adjusted prices is shown in red, 
observed in green. 
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Figure 18: Profit margins. Only adjusted costs. Red vertical line marks 1989, horizontal 0%.  Percentage. 
Figure 18 shows that the choice of adjusting the prices as described in section 5 have large 
effects on profit margins. The case with observed prices start out better than observed in 
1990, but then hover around zero, mostly on the negative side, for the rest of the period. For 
the years 1990-2005 it has an average of (-) 2,31%, as compared to the observed value of 
4,95%. 
The red line shows the most heavily simulated case. Both costs and prices are simulated. Its 
development is more dramatic than the other simulation. Initially it grows with the same 
speed as the observed case, and approach 15% in 1997. After this it plunges to the same 
negative levels as the case of observed prices. For the years 1990-2005 it has an average of 
3,21%. 
6.4.1 Market-effects 
As discussed in section 6.3.1, adjusting the individual’s effort seems reasonable. This is done 
in both cases in Figure 18. The thing separating the two cases is the adjustment of the market 
described in section 5. Adjusting the effort and the market is two quite different things. The 
first seem safe. If the simulation of the stock in section 3 is treated as factual, costs obviously 
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has to increase and decrease with landings. Creating a market effect through adjusting the 
prices is more speculative. It makes some assumptions about demand that is a best guess, but 
perhaps not perfect.  
Thus, it is not obvious that the best simulation of the counterfactual profit margins is the red 
line, where prices are adjusted. The actual profit margins as they would have developed if 
quotas were not introduced is probably somewhere between the red and the green line. It is 
not reasonable to argue that it should be below the green one. If this was the case, lower 
landings would cause strictly lower prices and vice versa.  
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the actual case would lie closer to the red line, where 
the market is simulated and prices are higher from 1993. They could be below, because under 
the open access regime more boats will join the fishery when profit margins are positive. This 
drive profit margins down over time, as there is less fish for every fisher, and the costs of 
catching it will increase. 
But the actual profit margins can also be higher than the red line. There is no variation in the 
simulation of prices, and thus extreme values are not very well simulated. The highest 
observed prices occur in 1999-2001. As seen from Figure 19, in these years simulated prices 
are considerably lower than the observed ones. This shows that the simulation is good for the 
average price, but not for the extreme values.  
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Figure 19: Observed and Counterfactual PAI in 1999-2001. 
To sum up, the way prices are simulated is consistent, but the drop in the red line in Figure 18 
in the years around 2000 might not be a good simulation. Further it is not obvious that the 
profit margin that would have occurred under open access is lower than the red line, it could 
be higher. Thus, the statement that observed profits beat all the simulations might have to be 
taken with a grain of salt. 
6.5 Wage-ability 
Wage-ability is another measure of profitability, used by the Directorate of Fisheries. Its 
calculation is described in section 4.2. In essence it show how much the fisher could get if all 
profits went to wages. 
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Figure 20: Wage-ability. Red vertical line marks 1990. NOK in 1998. 
Figure 20 shows the wage-ability and the four ways of simulating it. All colors correspond to 
the same case as in the figures showing profit.  
Wage-ability basically tells the same story as profits. The simulations do not beat the 
observed values in the long term; perhaps the distance is greater than for profits. Observed 
costs causes the simulations to take on lower values than adjusted costs. The market-effect is 
perhaps smaller; the red line does not seem to deviate as much from the green one, and the 
orange is quite close to the purple. 
As discussed in section 6.3.1, there are reasons to disregard the two cases where costs are 
observed. This is done in Figure 21, which shows wage-ability as a percentage of the 
observed value in 1989: 
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Figure 21: Wage-ability as percentage of observed in 1989. Red vertical line marks 1990.  Percentage. 
In the early 1990s, wage-ability seems to take on higher values than observed. But after 1994, 
observed values outgrow simulated and reach almost 400%. The interesting thing about this is 
that there are not big differences between the simulation where prices are adjusted and 
observed. They follow each other pretty much the whole way, and end up on the same value 
in 2005.  
This is caused by the share of wages in costs, between 40 and 50 percent in the period. 
Adjusted costs without wages thus deviate less from the observed values than when profits are 
simulated. 
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7 Regression Analysis 
Did the quotas cause profits to rise? Section 6 described a simulation of the profits, based on 
simulations of the stock in section 3 and prices in section 5. In this section a panel data 
analysis is described. As opposed to the simulations, such an approach can also try to answer 
if any of the changes in policy caused a rise in profits. It is possible to tell whether the 
introduction of quotas, the Structural Quota System, the Quota Exchange System or the 
proposed gliding change to an ITQ system had significant effects on profits. The software 
used is STATA. The regressions made in this section and elsewhere is based on econometric 
theory, see for example Greene (2012) chapter 11. 
7.1 Regressions 
The basic purpose of the regressions is to see how the performance of the fishers varies with 
effort and opportunities: 
ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܧ݂݂݋ݎݐ௜,௧ ൅	ߚଶ ∗ ܱ݌݌݋ݎݐݑ݊݅ݐ݁ݏ௜,௧ 
Performance is measured in profits. Effort is operationalized as Days at sea and (Number of) 
Men. Opportunities are measured in the size of the stock. Thus, the basic regression is: 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܦܽݕݏ	ܽݐ	ݏ݁ܽ௜,௧ ൅ 	ߚଶ ∗ ܯ݁݊௜,௧ ൅	ߚଷ ∗ ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௧ 
As quotas are introduced to the fishery, it is predicted from theory that the stock and profit 
should rise. The interesting question is what happened to profits, ceteris paribus. A higher 
stock will have an effect on profits, as it is less costly to catch a given harvest. This makes it 
necessary to replace Stock with Simulated Stock in the above equation. Thus, the effect from 
the change in stock on profits is removed. The Simulated Stock is the same as Simulated 
TBM from section 3. 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܦܽݕݏ	ܽݐ	ݏ݁ܽ௜,௧ ൅	ߚଶ ∗ ܯ݁݊௜,௧ ൅ 	ߚଷ ∗ ܵ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀	ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௧ 
After doing this, it is possible to include the binary variables described in section 2.4. The 
estimated effects of these dummies will be the effects of changing policy and market 
conditions on profits. 
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ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܦܽݕݏ	ܽݐ	ݏ݁ܽ௜,௧ ൅	ߚଶ ∗ ܯ݁݊௜,௧ ൅ 	ߚଷ ∗ ܵ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀	ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௧ ൅	ߚସ ∗ ܦ௫ 
7.2 Method 
Panel data estimation with Fixed effects is used. Fixed effects imply that there are non-
random effects between the boats. The simple truth is that some skippers and crews are more 
efficient than others. An approach with Random effects is also possible. This would give 
more efficient estimates, with lower standard errors. But since the Fixed effects between the 
boats are assumed, Random effects is not consistent. It therefore seems safer to use Fixed 
effects and loose some significance of the results. The significance of the effects of binary 
variables are unaffected by this. In order to take care of groupwise heteroskedasticity, robust 
standard errors are used throughout. 
7.3 Results of basic regression 
The results of the two methods mentioned are shown below. The first column shows Fixed 
effects with robust standard errors, Random effects are shown in the second. Stars indicate the 
level of significance; one is on 10 % level, two is 5% and three are on 1% level. 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
|        Variable |   FE_robust   |      RE       | 
| ----------------+---------------+---------------| 
| Profit          |               |               | 
|     Days_at_sea |  398.67722*** |  338.78233*** | 
|             Men |  -8803.097    |  42106.346*** | 
| Simulated_Stock | -.06835893*** | -.11478052*** | 
|           _cons |  141154.52    | -469.67158    | 
|-----------------+---------------+---------------| 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
The first column shows that the Fixed effects gives varying results. The effect of Days at sea 
is very significant at 399. This means that working another day increase the profit with 399 
NOK. Number of men is negative and not significant. The stock has a negative effect of 0.07, 
and is significant on a 1% level. This means that a stock which is one ton larger, decrease the 
profit with 0.07 NOK. The constant term is not significant. 
The effects in the Random effects regression are all significant on a 1% level, except for the 
constant term. The effect of another day at sea is lower than under Fixed effects, at about 339. 
Number of Men has turned in to a positive effect. Adding another man to the crew adds about 
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42000 NOK to profits. The effect of the stock has decreased further, to 0.11. And the constant 
term has turned negative. 
7.4 Regressions with Binary Variables 
7.4.1 Did the initiation of quotas cause profits? 
Using the binary variables discussed in section 2.4, a number of dummies are used to test 
whether the changes in policy and in the market changed the profitability of the fleet. 
The binary variable D1 tests whether or not the introduction of quotas caused profits. The 
result of including it is listed below. The first column show the same result as the first column 
in the results listed before. The second column includes the dummy D1. In order to save 
space, the results from including D2 and D3 are included in the third column. These results 
are discussed in section 7.4.2. In each column, the estimate is listed first, and its t-value below 
it. 
The F-statistic is a test of the hypothesis that the model predicts zero steepness of the curve. 
As seen from all reported results, the statistic is large enough to reject this hypothesis.  
+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
|        Variable |     FE     |     D1     |     D2     | 
|-----------------+------------+------------+------------| 
|     Days_at_sea |  398.67722 |  306.76079 |  309.38821 | 
|                 |       3.70 |       3.15 |       3.20 | 
|             Men |  -8803.097 |  10329.016 |   10880.27 | 
|                 |      -0.35 |       0.46 |       0.48 | 
| Simulated_Stock | -.06835893 | -.07185395 | -.06939462 | 
|                 |      -3.65 |      -3.85 |      -3.28 | 
|              D1 |            |   141968.4 |            | 
|                 |            |       3.75 |            | 
|              D2 |            |            |  141240.28 | 
|                 |            |            |       3.61 | 
|              D3 |            |            |  145786.73 | 
|                 |            |            |       3.49 | 
|           _cons |  141154.52 | -29213.472 | -34345.289 | 
|                 |       1.62 |      -0.40 |      -0.44 | 
+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
|         F-value |      16.95 |      15.75 |      12.64 | 
+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
                                               legend: b/t 
 
As seen from the results, the estimated effect of including the binary variable D1 is highly 
significant with a t-value of almost 4. The effect is estimated at around 142000 NOK. This is 
61 
 
a remarkable result; if it is close to true it says that the effect of the introduction of quotas in 
1990 increased the profits in the fleet with a large amount. Notice that the effect of Days at 
sea has fallen with 90 NOK.  The effect of the stock is now significant on a 1% level. The 
other effects from the basic regression are not significant. 
7.4.2 Did the system change to an ITQ Regime? 
Did the profits rise in the late 1990s? In section 2.3.2 the possibility of a silent change from an 
IVQ regime to an ITQ regime in 1998 was discussed. This is tested with the dummies D2 and 
D3. If the effects of the dummy D3 is positive and significant, this show that profits rose in 
the late 1990s. 
The results are listed in the previous subsection, column on the right. The effect of the dummy 
D2 is about 140000, and very significant. D3 is slightly larger, and highly significant. It is 
therefore possible to state that profits rose in the late 90s. This is a strong indication of a silent 
change to an ITQ regime.  
Notice again that the effect of Days at sea has fallen with 90 NOK. The other effects from the 
basic regression are not significant. 
7.4.3 Did SQS and QES have effects on profits? 
As discussed in section 2.4, the effects of introducing SQS and QES should be positive, since 
it gives the fishers more flexibility to trade quotas. There is only data available for the two last 
years in the dataset on this, so it would have to be very large effects in order to be significant.  
In the same way as the results for D1, D2 and D3 were listed above; the following results give 
the regression of D4 and D5 in the second and third columns. 
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+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
|        Variable |     FE     |     D4     |     D5     | 
|-----------------+------------+------------+------------| 
|     Days_at_sea |  398.67722 |  398.76504 |  402.32545 | 
|                 |       3.70 |       3.71 |       3.77 | 
|             Men |  -8803.097 | -8386.2884 | -7056.8258 | 
|                 |      -0.35 |      -0.33 |      -0.28 | 
| Simulated_Stock | -.06835893 | -.06750594 | -.06435046 | 
|                 |      -3.65 |      -3.62 |      -3.35 | 
|              D4 |            |  7592.1796 |            | 
|                 |            |       0.11 |            | 
|              D5 |            |            |  19288.503 | 
|                 |            |            |       0.45 | 
|           _cons |  141154.52 |  138350.75 |  128331.31 | 
|                 |       1.62 |       1.56 |       1.40 | 
+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
|         F-value |      16.95 |      12.71 |      12.72 | 
+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
                                               legend: b/t 
 
The effect of SQS is seen in the estimator for D4. The effect of QES is seen in the estimator 
for D5. The effects of the dummies are positive, but not significant. Thus, the impact of the 
change in policy is not strong enough to support the hypothesis that the boats earned more 
because of the easing of the policy. In order to say something more about the effects of SQS 
and QES, a longer time series would be needed.  
7.4.4 Did the largest vessels earn more? 
Redistribution of quotas was discussed in section 2.3.3. In essence, the largest boats got 
quotas from the smaller ones in the years 1990-2002. This should cause them to increase their 
profits more than the smaller ones. 
In order to capture the redistribution of quotas, the dummy D6 take on the value one in the 
period 1990-2002. But since it is not possible to know how large a boat has to be to be 
“large”, the regression must be with different length classes. The regression is done four 
times. The first regression includes only boats with length between 25 and 28 meters. The 
further regressions include smaller and smaller boats. Since the largest boats had most to gain 
from the redistribution of quotas, the first regression should have the largest and most 
significant effect on profit margins, with gradually falling magnitudes for the other dummies. 
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+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
|        Variable |     FE     |   25-28 m  |   22-28 m  |   19-28 m  |   15-28 m  | 
|-----------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------| 
|     Days_at_sea |  398.67722 |   1177.907 |  1905.5575 |   442.3811 |  470.17658 | 
|                 |       3.70 |       1.77 |       3.72 |       1.57 |       2.97 | 
|             Men |  -8803.097 | -261462.08 | -140461.12 | -14074.178 | -32252.818 | 
|                 |      -0.35 |      -2.25 |      -0.79 |      -0.22 |      -0.85 | 
| Simulated_Stock | -.06835893 |  .07986728 |  .40087912 | -.12860895 | -.11662861 | 
|                 |      -3.65 |       0.29 |       1.78 |      -1.87 |      -3.82 | 
|              D6 |            |  346265.49 |  330454.52 |  231708.46 |  179349.62 | 
|                 |            |       0.86 |       0.70 |       2.98 |       3.61 | 
|           _cons |  141154.52 |  1716488.2 |  725903.94 |  225930.42 |  208475.68 | 
|                 |       1.62 |       2.15 |       0.64 |       0.61 |       1.36 | 
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
                                                                         legend: b/t 
The results are listed above. Estimated effects are decreasing monotonous as smaller and 
smaller vessels are included. This supports the hypothesis from section 2.3.3. But significance 
of the results is increasing as more boats are included. Only the two last regressions, which 
include almost all boats in the dataset, are significant on acceptable levels. These dummies are 
so similar to D1 that they probably pick up the quota effect, not the effect of quota 
redistribution. In other words, the statement that the largest boats increased their profits 
compared to the smaller in the 1990s is only true if you include almost all boats. This can 
hardly be said to be a strong result.  
The effects from the basic regression are varying enormously in both magnitude and 
significance. 
7.5 Predictions 
It seems unnecessary to try to predict the profit margins for all the models, as some effects are 
very insignificant. After getting the residuals for predicting the profits using all binary 
variables, it turn out that using D2 and D3 together give the smallest residuals. 
As seen from Figure 22 the prediction of mean profits using the results from the basic 
regression – in red - is not very good. It is higher than the observed values early in the dataset, 
and lower later. Observed values are shown in blue. 
It is also seen from Figure 22 that the rise in the predicted profits when D2 and D3 are 
included – in yellow - comes in the change from 1989 to 1990 and 1997 to 1998. Thus, D2 
captures the rise in profit from the 80s to the 90s, and D3 a change in the late 1990s. A 
histogram of the residuals is shown in Appendix 7.1. 
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Figure 22: Predicted Profit margins using basic model and model with D2 and D3. 
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8 Concluding remarks 
8.1 Stock, Effort and Landings 
Section 8 discusses the results and concludes. One of the predictions from theory is that the 
size of the stock should increase when quotas are introduced. The simulated stock in Figure 8 
in section 3.5.2, show that the prediction is supported. 
8.2 Simulated Profits 
The observed profit, profit margins and wage-ability show a clear upward development. There 
is little doubt that the fishers earned more money in the post 1990-era than before. The 
question remains what caused this rise. Sections 6 and 7 present different analysis of the 
development in profitability. In this section these results are discussed. 
The simulations in section 6 give an indication that a rise in profitability would have occurred 
if the pattern of landings seen in the years before 1990 had continued. Over time the 
simulated profit margins are lower than the observed. This could be caused by the quotas.  
Knowing this for certain is something else. Landings are simulated, and all subsequent 
simulations of landings for the fisher, prices and profits are based on this. The simulation of 
landings has an error term which grows over time. This makes the simulated profits more 
trustworthy in the early years and less so in the last years.  
This is especially true for the simulated profits where landings, prices and costs are simulated. 
The error term can propagate through all these factors and make the result more uncertain 
over time. Thus, the “real” counterfactual profits which would have been seen if the quotas 
had not been introduced could be higher or lower, and at the end of the period the simulation 
is probably quite far of.  
However, the method used is consistent. It is based on logical use of economic theory and the 
data. The most heavily simulated case is the best guess offered of the counterfactual profits. If 
this simulation is trusted, the average profit margin in the 15 years after 1990 was 1.74% 
higher than it would have been without quotas. Thus, the simulation gives answers to both of 
the main questions stated in the introduction. 
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Section 6.1.3 discusses the possibility that higher landings per se explain higher profits. The 
result is ambiguous, but it may seem like the increased landings, caused by profits or not, are 
unable to explain profits late in the period. Thus something else must explain them, for 
example quotas. 
In section 6.1.4 fishers investments were discussed. Since data on boats capital are not 
obtained, and the values of quotas are not collected by the Directorate of fisheries, this 
discussion looked at costs of capital. These costs have a marked increase from 1997, without 
being explained by the real interest rate. Higher volume of debt is the plausible explanation, 
and this debt must stem from investment in something. This something is likely to be boats. 
Since quotas followed the boats, buying boats was the only way fishers could acquire higher 
quotas. Speculative as it may seem, this is an indication that fishers invested heavily in quotas 
in the late 1990s. Thus, Tradability seems to be an important aspect of quotas, no matter if 
they are IVQ. Fishers find a way to trade them, even if it’s not the intention of the state. 
8.3 Regressed Profits 
The regressions in section 7 test the data for different changes in policy. One regression that 
has a clear result is the one controlling for a regime change in 1990, D1. This has an estimated 
effect on profits of almost 142000. Thus, it seems safe to say that the profits rose because of 
the introduction of quotas.  
However, quotas may not explain the whole increase in profits. As discussed in section 2.3.3, 
full-time fishers were given larger quotas than part-timers in the 1990s, and new entrants had 
a hard time getting full quotas. Both these effects limited the number of full-time fishers in 
Group 1. Theoretically, profits are driven down under open access because new entrants come 
into the fishery when profits are positive. Since entry was limited, any positive resource rent 
would remain with those already fishing, regardless of regime. This speaks against the 
statement that quotas alone caused profits to increase. 
On the other hand, the quotas seem to be the most radical change to the fishers’ reality in the 
early 1990s, not the division of fishers into Group 1 and Group 2. Fishers were full-timers or 
part-timers ahead of this division, and even noted as such in the Directorates’ register over 
fishers. 
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Further, subsidies where removed in the same period as the introduction of quotas. The rise in 
profitability at the same time is an indication that the effects of quotas outweighed the 
subsidies by a large margin. 
Section 2.2 argued that there are separate effects on profits from the quotas being Individual 
and being Tradable. At first quotas were Individual but not Tradable. In theory they are so to 
this day. The initial effect on observed profit margins seen in Figure 13 reflects this Individual 
ownership. Fishers did no longer have to maximize their effort in a short period. Instead their 
effort was limited. This increased profits because prices rose and costs fell. In addition, 
fishers could plan their own season and deliver better quality. 
This thesis, along with other literature, argues that there is a significant effect on profits from 
the quotas becoming de facto Tradable in the course of the 1990s. This is tested in section 
7.4.2, and results for the binary variables are high and significant. The effect of D2 captures 
the Individuality. This is strong and significant. But the same goes for D3, which is meant to 
capture the effect of the quotas becoming Tradable. The strong effect on D3 may be caused by 
better environmental conditions, or that the fishers needed time to adjust their effort after the 
new policy was introduced. But at least part of the increase might stem from the increased 
efficiency that occurs when quotas become Tradable. Thus, the results support the ideas of 
Hersoug et.al (2000b). 
The idea that SQS and QES increased profitability is tested in section 7.4.3. The effects are 
not significant. As mentioned, the dataset on this development is not very long. It would be 
interesting to do the regressions again when a longer dataset is available. 
In section 2.3.3 the growth of the large coastal vessels were discussed, and its impact on 
profits tested in section 7.4.4. The results are not very strong. Hersoug (2005), which is the 
basis of this discussion, argue that the investments rose, not the profitability. Nevertheless, 
investments should be made because the fishers expect profits to rise. If profits are expected 
to rise, this should be linked to some growth in profits at the present. Thus, there should be 
some link between present investments and profits. Since the analysis does not support higher 
present profits for the fishers, it seems vague to say that the large investments were based on 
real experiences of profits. 
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8.4 Change to ITQ? 
As argued, the quota system became more market oriented, through market powers and 
through government easing of the regulation. The results of these changes are estimated to be 
positive on profitability. In the same period subsidies shrunk to very low levels. This 
systematic change and the graph of the observed profits tell us that fishers are better of in a 
closed fishery than in an open where they receive subsidies. 
One might say that the fisheries in 1985 depended on the state, and depended only on the 
amount of cod in 2005. Is it not only fair to say that this has been a healthy development for 
the fisheries?  
Today Norway has a de jure IVQ system with some regulations that make it possible to lease 
for a couple of years quotas etc. This system approaches a de facto ITQ system. The results 
from this paper show that any change towards a freer market of quotas has been good for the 
fishers. Is it not time for the government to take the final step, and introduce ITQs by law? 
This would have positive effects on profitability. This is not necessarily an argument that 
sounds good for Norwegians, because of the special place rural policy has in politics. As 
mentioned before, the fisheries policy try to cover many goals, and a central idea is to keep 
fisheries spread along the whole coast. This is not necessarily the result if quotas are traded 
free of restrictions. 
But politicians should also see the opportunities that higher profitability gives. The 
Norwegian oil industry pay a resource tax of 50% on top of the regular corporate tax. The 
argument behind this is that the oil belongs to the people, and its value should go back to the 
people. If the same logic is applied to cod as to oil, fishers should pay a corporate tax and a 
resource tax on top. Fisheries do not experience a profitability that justifies a resource tax of 
50%, but that percentage could be specified for the industry. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This paper has tried to describe the development in profitability of Norwegian coastal 
demersal fishers in the period 1985-2005. The big change in policy in this period was the 
introduction of quotas in 1990. As argued, the profitability increased, and this was most likely 
caused by the introduction of quotas in 1990. 
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8.6 Suggestions for further research 
Suggestions for further research would include better controls for subsidies. This is included 
in revenues in the dataset used in this paper. By withdrawing them, it would be possible to 
make a better analysis of profitability based on real activity. 
By including individual data on capital it would be possible to use different measures of 
profitability. If capital included financial value of quotas, some interesting analysis of the 
value of quotas could be done.  
In the simulations of profit, costs are adjusted linearly. Since costs probably have a falling 
marginal increase in landings, they could arguably be adjusted non-proportionally. The results 
of this would have been interesting to see. 
And finally, it would be interesting to look at how high a resource tax the fishers could pay 
and still make enough money to keep the effort on todays level. This would have to take 
profitability into account, as well as the effects of changing or withdrawing existing taxes. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 3.1: The regression of Landingst on TBMt-1 
ܤܽݏ݅ܿ	ܯ݋݈݀݁:	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ 
Results: 
reg Landings TBM_1 in years 1960-1989 
 Estimate Standard Error t-value 
Constant 38623.58 57875.14 0.67 
TBM_1 .3447801    .0314481     10.96 
R-squared 0.8111 
Degrees of freedom 29 
Root MSE 1.2e+05 
Residuals: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------      
Variable  |    Obs  |   Mean    |  Std. Dev. |   Min    |   Max   | 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------   
Plandings |     61  |  644541.8 |  201438.9  |352845.9  | 1157774 | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Several other relationships were tested on the time-period 1960-1989, before choosing the 
Basic Model. They include quadratic terms for the Total biomass and years since 1960. The 
later term is included in order to model technological change. The models are easily 
replaceable in the simulation. Models: 
ܯ݋݈݀݁	1:	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ሺܶܤܯ௧ିଵሻ^2 
ܯ݋݈݀݁	2:	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧
ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ݕ݁ܽݎ_݂ܽݐ݁ݎ_1960 ൅ ߚସ
∗ ሺݕ݁ܽݎ_݂ܽݐ݁ݎ_1960ሻ^2 
ܯ݋݈݀݁	3:	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧
ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ሺܶܤܯ௧ିଵሻ^2 ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ݕ݁ܽݎ_݂ܽݐ݁ݎ_1960 ൅ ߚସ
∗ ሺݕ݁ܽݎ_݂ܽݐ݁ݎ_1960ሻ^2 
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ܯ݋݈݀݁	4:	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ∗ ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ln	 _ݕ݁ܽݎ_݂ܽݐ݁ݎ_1960 
ܯ݋݈݀݁	5:	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଶ ∗ ln	 _ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ 
ܯ݋݈݀݁	6:	ܮܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଶ ∗ ln	 _ܶܤܯ௧ିଵ 	൅ ߚଷ ∗ ln	 _ݕ݁ܽݎ_݂ܽݐ݁ݎ_1960 
Results: For each estimator, the estimate is listed first, then standard-error, and then t-value. 
+-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
|           Variable |  Model_1   |  Model_2   |  Model_3   | 
|--------------------+------------+------------+------------| 
|              TBM_1 |  .36552714 |  .37123514 |  .50429066 | 
|                    |  .15195817 |  .04431422 |  .18395389 | 
|                    |       2.41 |       8.38 |       2.74 | 
|           TBM_1_sq | -5.621e-09 |            | -3.272e-08 | 
|                    |  4.025e-08 |            |  4.388e-08 | 
|                    |      -0.14 |            |      -0.75 | 
|    year_after_1960 |            |  13788.611 |  13806.053 | 
|                    |            |  9386.8992 |  9468.1186 | 
|                    |            |       1.47 |       1.46 | 
| year_after_1960_sq |            | -332.20708 | -288.01238 | 
|                    |            |  333.47915 |  341.54546 | 
|                    |            |      -1.00 |      -0.84 | 
|              _cons |  22146.912 | -111862.72 | -241676.79 | 
|                    |  131865.16 |  109459.72 |  206151.03 | 
|                    |       0.17 |      -1.02 |      -1.17 | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
R-sq:                |    0.8112  |   0.8330   | 0.8366     | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
                                               legend: b/se/t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
|           Variable |  Model_4   |  Model_5   |  Model_6   | 
|--------------------+------------+------------+------------| 
|              TBM_1 |  .36902442 |            |            | 
|                    |    .034168 |            |            | 
76 
 
|                    |      10.80 |            |            | 
| ln_year_after_1960 |  17609.877 |            |  36982.471 | 
|                    |  27664.727 |            |  31292.186 | 
|                    |       0.64 |            |       1.18 | 
|           ln_TBM_1 |            |  543425.59 |  603637.92 | 
|                    |            |   54861.77 |  62146.259 | 
|                    |            |       9.91 |       9.71 | 
|              _cons | -36955.486 | -7125522.6 | -8066439.5 | 
|                    |   110109.2 |  783181.74 |  929656.61 | 
|                    |      -0.34 |      -9.10 |      -8.68 | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
R-sq:                |    0.8468  |    0.7780  |    0.8184  | 
+-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
                                               legend: b/se/t 
As seen from the estimates, other models have better R-squared, but the standard-errors for 
estimates are much larger. t-values are not very good for all estimates in any model. 
 
Residuals: 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
Basic_Resi~l |        30   -.0010417    114366.3  -235663.3   249510.2 
Residuals_~1 |        30   -.0020833      114325  -250348.3   234737.3 
Residuals_~2 |        30           0    107524.9  -211904.4   201495.5 
Residuals_~3 |        30     -.00625    106348.8  -218769.1   196168.4 
Residuals_~4 |        29    .0032328    104814.3  -235976.7   206534.9 
Residuals_~5 |        30    .0005208    123974.8  -247841.6   244059.1 
Residuals_~6 |        29    .0021552    114113.1  -247994.7     202750 
 
As seen from this, other models have equal or smaller residuals.  Still, the t-values for the 
estimates are best for the Basic Model. This is why this model is chosen. 
 
Appendix 3.2: Stata-codes for chapter 3: 
*Get the data from ICES. It is available from http://www.ices.dk/datacentre/StdGraphDB.asp 
*Download the database 
*Find NEA cod in the database, and download / extract from database. 
*Load data into stata 11 or newer version. 
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*Copy and paste this code into the do-file, and execute: 
 
*Rename variables, in order not to get confused: 
rename  age3 N3 
rename total_bm TBM 
rename  ssb SSB 
rename landings Landings 
rename yieldssb YieldSSB 
rename  fbar M 
label variable YieldSSB "Landings / SSB" 
label variable year "Year" 
label variable M "Mean Fish Mortality" 
tsset year 
gen SSB_3 = l3.SSB 
label variable SSB_3 "Stock of Spawning Biomass Three Years earlier" 
keep if year>1948 
sum 
 
*Non-linear regression of Beverton-Holt relationship: 
nl (N3 = {a}*SSB_3/(1 + {b}*SSB_3)) 
*Initial Steepness 
di 7.143362/(8.32e-06 ) // =858577.16 Recruitment approach this value asymptotically when 
SSB_3 approach infinity 
 
*Regression for Landings: 
reg Landings TBM_1 if year in 12/41 
 
*Calculating a 
gen a = N3*(1+(8.32e-06)*SSB_3)/SSB_3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.1: Profits using the second method of calculating revenues 
Figure 23 shows the profit using the second method of calculating revenues, as discussed in 
section 6.2.1. 
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Figure 23: Profit, observed and simulated. Adjusted for inflation. Red vertical line marks 1990. NOK in 1998. 
The figure shows that simulated profits take on smaller values than when method one is used. 
Observed profits are highest in almost each single year. Thus, method two does not adjust the 
revenues as much upwards as method one. This could mean that there is not a proportionate 
factor between value of landings and revenue, as method two suggests. Underreporting of 
landings might not be a problem. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7.1: Histogram over residuals from predicting profits with D2 and D3 
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Figure 24: Histogram showing the density of residuals from predicting profits with D2 and D3 
Figure 24 shows that the prediction has residuals which are close to normally distributed, 
perhaps with a too large kurtosis. 
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